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NOTES
THE EMPLOYEE AS INVESTOR: THE CASE FOR
UNIVERSAL APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS TO EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP
PLANS*
Beginning in the mid-1970s, large numbers of employees became
equity investors through widespread corporate adoption of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs).1 The sudden popularity of
this form of worker ownership was not the result of a workers'
revolution, but was instead a response to generous tax subsidies.2
Congress believed that inducing private ESOP formation promised
increased productivity and a broadened base of capital ownership
in America.3 Whether ESOPs actually have produced the social
benefits Congress desired is debatable.4 One certain consequence of
the ESOP movement, however, is that a significant percentage of
American labor now holds corporate stock.5 ESOPs have bloomed
as a result of congressional tax incentives.' In 1989, approximately

The author wishes to thank Professor Jayne W Barnard for her assistance.
1. Companies began adopting ESOPs on a large scale with the passage of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988), and the
Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 89 Stat. 26 (1975). See generally JOSEPH E.
BACHELDER, III, EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS at vii, 3-7 (1979) (describing ESOP origins); D. Bret Carlson, ESOPs and Unwersal Capitalism, 31 TAX L. REV. 289 (1976) (tracing
legislative background of ESOPs).
2. See infra note 132 (describing ESOP tax subsidies).
3. See Carlson, supra note 1, at 290-91; infra notes 106, 129-30 and accompanying text.
4. For works of commentators skeptical of the ESOP concept, see JOSEPH R. BLASI, EM9
PLOYEE OWNERSHIP: REVOLUTION OR RIPOFF ? (1988); Carlson, supra note 1; William R. Levin,
Note, The False Promise of Worker Capitalism: Congress and the Leveraged Employee
Stock Ownership Plan, 95 YALE L.J. 148 (1985).
5. Over 9,500 companies adopted ESOPs by the end of 1988. Matthew M. O'Toole, The
DisproportionateEffects of an ESOP's ProportionalVoting, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 824, 831 n.40
(1991).
6. See infra notes 132-35.
*
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one-fourth of all corporate employees in America, roughly ten million workers, participated in over ten thousand ESOPs.'
As a general rule, purchasers of securities are entitled to the protections afforded by the Securities Act of 19338 (1933 Act) and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934' (1934 Act). These protections include mandatory disclosure of financial information necessary to
make an informed investment decision, as well as broad remedies
entitling investors to redress for any false or misleading statements
made in connection with the purchase or sale of any security '0
Congress intended the Securities Acts to be remedial in nature. 1
Fraudulent and abusive trading practices of the 1920s, followed by
the financial collapse of 1929, formed the principal impetus behind
their enactment.12 Rather than regulate the substantive worth of
securities being offered to the public, as many states had done,
Congress chose to mandate disclosure, and hence liberate investors
from ignorance." The underlying policy behind the Securities Acts
reflects the notion that "[s]unlight is said to be the best of disin4
fectants; electric light the most efficient policeman."'
The people most likely to benefit from the disclosure requirements, at least in theory, are those investors for whom the cost of
7. Frederick Ungeheuer, They Own the Place, TIME, Feb. 6, 1989, at 50, 50. Corporations
that have established ESOPs include Avis, Anheuser-Busch, Delta Airlines, Exxon, GTE,
ITT, McDonald's, J.C. Penney, Proctor & Gamble, Texaco, Unisys, United Technologies,
and Xerox. Linda E. Rappaport & John J. Cannon III, Counseling Corporate Clients in the
Uses and Implications of Leveraged ESOPs, 663 PRAc. L. INST. CORP. 747, 751 (1989).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1988).
9. Id. §§ 78a-78kk.
10. Id. §§ 77e, 77q(a), 78j(b); see infra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
11. The 1933 Act is "[a]n act to provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate
commerce and to prevent fraud in the sale thereof." Preface to the
Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
The basic policy of [the 1933 Act] is that of informing the investor of the facts
concerning securities to be offered for sale
to prevent further exploitation
of the public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and worthless securities
through misrepresentation; to place adequate and true information before the
investor
S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
12. See THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.2 (2d ed. 1990); J.
Robert Brown, Corporate Communications and the Federal Securities Laws, 53 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 741, 742 n.2 (1985).

13. See LARRY D. SODERQUIST,
14. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER

UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS 2 (1990).
PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (Augustus M. Kelley ed., 1971).
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obtaining information necessary to make efficient and informed investment decisions is prohibitively high.' 5 Among participants of
ESOPs are an ever-increasing number of blue-collar union employees who are relatively unsophisticated in the intricacies of the financial markets, and who would probably not otherwise own financial securities. 6 Their need for the Securities Acts' protection is
7
therefore compelling.'
The question, therefore, is whether employee interests in ESOPs
are subject to the regulatory purview of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and, specifically, whether participants' interests in ESOPs are securities within the meaning of the federal securities laws. Although this issue is of relatively recent vintage, the
courts that have considered the question are split and inconsistent
in both analysis and outcome.
In the recent decision of Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor
Freight, Inc.,'" the Tenth Circuit held that an employee stock
ownership plan was a security within the meaning of the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, thus rendering the plan subject to the registration and antifraud provisions of
the Acts.' 9 In reaching this result, the court employed the threepronged "investment contract" test first used by the Supreme
Court in SEC v. W.J Howey Co.20 The Tenth Circuit's analysis
closely tracked, and ostensibly applied, the analysis used in
InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,2 1 in which the
Supreme Court held that an involuntary, noncontributory, defined
benefit pension plan was not an investment contract and hence
was not a security within the meaning of the Securities Acts. 2

15. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for A Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 722 (1984).
16. See infra notes 239-55 and accompanying text.
17. A 1980 General Accounting Office study concluded that employers frequently overstated the value of stock offered under ESOPs, and performed appraisal valuations that

lacked independence or ignored relevant factors.

COMPTROLLER GEN., GAO, EMPLOYEE STOCK
OWNERSHIP PLANS: WHO BENEFITS MOST IN CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES? 22 (1980).

18. 940 F.2d 564 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 589 (1991); see infra notes 163-72
and accompanying text.
19. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 585.
20. 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946); see infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
21. 439 U.S. 551 (1979); see infra notes 47-63 and accompanying text.
22. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 558-70.
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Other courts that have considered the question of whether interests in employee stock ownership plans are securities have also
used the Howey test, as modified and applied in Daniel.2" These
courts, however, have reached widely disparate outcomes, often opposite from the result reached in Uselton. In contrast, two courts
have refused to apply the Howey-Daniel formulation to resolve
this question, relying instead on a literal reading of the Securities
Acts.2 4 The Supreme Court gave explicit support to this textual
approach in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth.2 5 Those courts applying this analysis consistently have found that ESOP interests
are securities under federal law
This Note advances the primary thesis that employees who participate in ESOPs are acquiring securities, and are therefore no
less entitled to the protections of the Securities Acts and the concomitant benefits of accurate information than are ordinary investors. Moreover, this Note urges universal application of the Securities Acts, as opposed to application of the unpredictable and factspecific test embodied in the Howey-Dantel formulation. Criticism
will focus on two factors that explain why some courts have held
that ESOP interests fall outside the definition of a security- the
treatment of ESOPs as the functional equivalent of conventional
pension plans; and relatedly, misplaced reliance on the Daniel
decision.
This Note first reviews the Securities Acts and their underlying
policies. It then describes the relevant history of Supreme Court
cases regarding the definition of a security and demonstrates the
Court's recent departure from a functional, fact-specific approach
to a more literal application of the plain meaning of the Securities
Acts. A reconciliation of the two leading Supreme Court cases addressing this issue, Daniel, representing the functional approach,
and Landreth, representing the textual approach, will follow After
examining the characteristics of ESOPs and the mechanics of

23. See, e.g., Childers v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 688 F Supp. 1357 (D. Minn. 1988);
Bauman v. Bish, 571 F Supp. 1054 (N.D. W Va. 1983); see infra notes 152-62, 173-83 and
accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Hood v. Smith's Transfer Corp., 762 F Supp. 1274 (W.D. Ky. 1991); Harris
v. Republic Airlines, Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,772
(D.D.C. May 18, 1988); see infra notes 206-32 and accompanying text.
25. 471 U.S. 681, 693-94 (1984); see tnfra notes 64-84 and accompanying text.
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ESOP transactions, this Note critiques the application of the
Howey-Darnel formulation to ESOPs. This critique compares cases
that utilized the Howey-Darnel criteria to those cases that applied
the textual approach. This Note concludes that the Howey-Damel
formulation or functional test is an inappropriate analytical device
for determining whether ESOPs are subject to the 1933 and 1934
Acts. A literal application of the Securities Acts better serves their
broad remedial purpose and best protects employees who invest in
their employer's stock.
A review of other related issues, namely the acute need for investor protection in the ESOP context and potential ERISA preemption, concludes that concurrent ERISA regulation should present
no bar to application of the Securities Acts. Finally, this Note addresses an issue that is essential to application of the Securities
Acts to ESOPs: if an ESOP interest is a security, does an "offer to
sell" or "sale" of a security "for value" take place, as required by
the Acts? Special difficulties as to the offer or sale issue arise in
the context of ESOPs resulting from collective bargaining agreements. This Note concludes that a sale or offer for value does indeed occur in this context, particularly with respect to the 1933
Act's registration and antifraud requirements.
THE

1933

AND

1934

SECURITIES ACTS

For the Securities Acts to apply, the following must be shown:
the existence of a security;2" under the 1933 Act, a sale for value or
an offer to sell for value;2" and, under the 1934 Act, the sale of a
security 28 If an instrument is in fact a security, and its issuer contemplates an offer to sell for value, its issuer must comply with the
registration requirements of the 1933 Act and is subject to the antifraud provisions of that Act."9 If a sale of a security has occurred,

26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(1), 78c(a)(10) (1988).
27. Id. § 77b(3). "The term 'sale' or 'sell' shall include every contract of sale or disposition
of a security or interest in a security, for value. The term 'offer to sell'
shall include
every attempt or offer to dispose of
a security or interest in a security, for value." Id.
28. Id. § 78b(14). "The terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to sell or otherwise
dispose of." Id. The "for value" requirement is conspicuously absent from the 1934 Act. For
the possible significance of this omission, see infra note 292.
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 771, 77q. Section 5(c) of the 1933 Act even prohibits the offer of an
unregistered security:
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the continuing disclosure requirements" and antifraud provisions3
of the 1934 Act provide private and SEC enforcement remedies.32
Although general securities registration entails significant cost,
registration of employee benefit plans such as ESOPs requires
completion of the less expensive form S-8 registration statement.3
The registration statement requires the issuer to disclose facts concerning the company's operations, management structure, financial
status, existing securities arrangements, and any other information
necessary for investors to make informed and intelligent investment decisions. 4 Failing to register a security, or making incomplete, false, or misleading statements in a registration statement or
in connection with the offer or sale of a security, potentially will
subject the issuer to both criminal and civil penalties.3 5
The 1933 Act contains general antifraud provisions that proscribe making fraudulent statements in connection with the
purchase, sale, or offer of a security "I These provisions are not de-

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium
of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has
been filed as to such security
Id. § 77e(c).
30. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
31. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j; infra note 38 and accompanying text.
33. See Employee Benefit Plans, Securities Act Release No. 6281, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 1052 (Jan. 15, 1981). Disclosure requirements of form S-8 are not so extensive as
those of other registration forms, such as the standard S-1 form. Cf. Employee Benefit
Plans, Securities Act Release No. 6188, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1051 (Feb. 1, 1980) [hereinafter Securities Act Release No. 6188]. Moreover, the SEC recently has promulgated rules
streamlining the S-8 process, easing requirements for S-8 registration, thereby broadening
the class of employers who may utilize the S-8 form, and rendering compliance generally
less expensive. See Registration and Reporting Requirements for Employee Benefit Plans,
Securities Act Release No. 6867, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %84,605
(June 6, 1990) [hereinafter Securities Act Release No. 6867].
34. See HAZEN, supra note 12, § 3.1-.2 (discussing securities registration).
35. Violations of Section 5 of the 1933 Act give rise to possible criminal sanctions or SEC
injunctions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77t, 77y. Section 12(1) of the 1933 Act contemplates civil liability for any person who offers or sells a security in violation of the Act's registration requirements. Id. § 771(i). Section 11(a) also provides an express right of action for securities
purchasers when a registration statement contains any untrue or misleading statements or
omissions of material fact. Id. § 77k(1). Section 17 of the 1933 Act contains a general antifraud provision. Id. § 77q. See generally HAZEN, supra note 12, § 7.1 (describing remedies).
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 771, 77q.
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pendent on the registration requirements; they apply to the offer
or sale of any security, regardless of whether a particular transaction is exempt from registration." The 1934 Act imposes on the
issuer a duty to provide continuing disclosure and subjects the issuer to potential antifraud liability for any untrue statement or
omission of material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of
a security 38
The 1933 and 1934 Acts define a security by naming various instruments.3 9 Because of the remedial nature of the Securities Acts
and the almost unlimited capacity of human beings to create myriad forms of investment schemes, Congress intended the definition
of a security to be "sufficiently broad and [in] general terms so as
to include within that definition the many types of instruments
that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a

security ,,4o

37. Id. See generally HAZEN, supra note 12, § 7.5-.6 (discussing 1933 Act antifraud
provisions).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); see also SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990) (stating that
the use of deception in securities exchanges is unlawful); HAZEN, supra note 12, §§ 9.3,
13.1-.2 (discussing 1934 Act continuous reporting requirements and antifraud provisions).
39. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(1), 78c(a)(10).
[U]nless the context otherwise requires
[t]he term "security" means any
note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateraltrust certificate
transferable share, investment contract, voting trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security,
or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of,
or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Id. § 77b(1). The Supreme Court consistently has held that the two definitions of security
contained in the 1933 and 1934 Acts are essentially the same, despite minor differences. See,
e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 n.1 (1990).
40. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933); see also Reves, 494 U.S. at 60 (recognizing that "Congress painted with a broad brush" when it drafted the definitional provisions of the Acts). The Supreme Court has held that "remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes. The Securities Exchange Act quite clearly falls
into the category of remedial legislation," Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967),
and "Congress did not intend to adopt a narrow or restrictive concept of security in defining
that term." Id. at 338.
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THE DEFINITION OF "SECURITY"

Since the inception of the Securities Acts, courts and commentators have struggled to define the term "security "41 The Supreme
Court has entered the definitional fray on numerous occasions. Examination of these decisions reveals the evolution of the Court's
analytical process, from a fact-specific analysis to a more predictable and consistent approach.
The Howey Test
The Supreme Court, in SEC v. W.J Howey Co.,4 2 provided the

seminal Howey-or "investment contract"-test. 3 The Court held
that an offering of units of a citrus grove development coupled
with a contract for cultivating, marketing, and remitting the proceeds of the harvest is a security within the meaning of the Acts. 4
More specifically, the Court deemed the interest an "investment
contract.

'45

Essentially, the Howey formulation uses a three-prong

test to determine whether an instrument qualifies as an investment
contract, thus subjecting it to the Acts: first, whether the instrument involves an investment of money; second, whether it is an
investment in a common enterprise; and third, whether there is a
reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the managerial
or entrepreneurial efforts of others.46
41. See, e.g., M. Thomas Arnold, "When is a Car a Bicycle?" and Other Riddles: The
Definition of a Security Under the Federal Securities Laws, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449 (198485); Scott FitzGibbon, What Is a Security? A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to Participate in the FinancialMarkets, 64 MINN. L. REV. 893 (1980); Lawrence F Orbe III, A Security: The Quest for a Definition, 12 SEc. REG. L.J. 220 (1984); Gary S. Rosin, Functional
Exclusions from the Definition of a Security, 28 S. TEx. L. REV. 333 (1986); Marc I. Steinberg & William E. Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the Definition of "Security"- The
"Context" Clause, "Investment Contract" Analysis, and Their Ramifications, 40 VAND. L.
REV. 489 (1987); Symposium, Interpreting the Statutory Definition of a Security: Some
Pragmatic Considerations,6 ST. MARY's L.J. 95 (1974).
42. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
43. Id. at 298-99.
44. Id. at 299-301.
45. Id. at 297. Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act and section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act include
the term "investment contract." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1), 78c(a)(10) (1988); se supra note 39.
46. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301, further explained and slightly modified in United Hous.
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1974).
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Pension Plans as Securities
The Court considered the definitional status of an employee
benefit pension plan in InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v.
Daniel.47 The Court applied the functional Howey test.48 The
Court's analysis in Daniel became the touchstone for determining
whether pension plans are subject to the Securities Acts.4 e
In Daniel, a local chapter of the Teamsters union collectively
bargained with plaintiff's employer, a Chicago trucking firm, to
produce a defined benefit pension plan for employees represented
by the union." The plan was "involuntary," meaning all union
members had to accept the plan as a condition of employment if a
majority of employees voted to participate in it, and "noncontributory," meaning the employees paid nothing to the plan on an individual basis, although they did relinquish an unspecified amount of
5
higher wages1.
After the plan administrator refused to provide retirement benefits to the plaintiff, the plaintiff brought suit alleging
fraud in connection with the sale of a security in violation of the
1933 and 1934 Acts.52
The Court used the Howey test to resolve the issue, observing
that the test "embodies the essential attributes that run through
all of the Court's decisions defining a security " The Court's ap-

47. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
48. Id. at 558.
49. In the context of employee benefit plans, the Howey test is hereinafter referred to as
the Howey-Danzel test. Because of the Court's focus on the voluntary and contributory aspects of the pension plan at issue, it in effect modified the Howey test as applied to pension
interests to include as criteria the voluntary and contributory nature of pension plans. See
infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
50. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 553. In addition, subsequent collective bargaining agreements
called for greater employer contributions to the plan. Id. at 554.
51. Id. at 553.
52. Id. at 555. The plaintiff was denied benefits because of an involuntary break in premium contributions for four months when he was laid off. Id. at 555 n.4.
53. Id. at 558 n.11 (quoting United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852
(1975)). The plaintiff had attempted to argue that his pension interest constituted a "certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement." Id. The Court dismissed
the argument:
[R]espondent here does not seriously contend that a "certificate of interest
in any profit-sharing agreement" has any broader meaning under the Securities
Acts than an "investment contract." In [Forman], we observed that the Howey
test, which has been used to determine the presence of an investment contract,
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plication of the Howey test was fact-specific, hinging
on the invol54
untary and noncontributory nature of the plan.
Because the plaintiff had made a decision only to become employed, rather than to give up "some tangible and definable consideration in return for an interest that had substantially the characteristics of a security, '55 the interest failed the first "investment"
prong of the test.5 6 The Court stated that the investment that did
take place constituted only a "relatively insignificant part of an
employee's total and indivisible compensation package. ' 57 The
Court rejected the argument that the plaintiff's labor constituted
adequate consideration for an "investment" to take place:
Only in the most abstract sense may it be said that an employee
"exchanges" some portion of his labor in return for these possible benefits. He surrenders his labor as a whole, and in return
receives a compensation package
that is substantially devoid of
5
aspects resembling a security.
The pension interest also failed the "expectation of profits"
prong. Only one-fifth of the pension plan's income derived from
investment profit; the remaining four-fifths derived from employer
contributions, with increased contributions used to compensate for
shortfalls in earnings. 5 Moreover, the realization of plan benefits
depended more on the employee's ability to meet the vesting requirements than on the fund's investment success.60
The Court added that application of the Securities Acts to these
types of noncontributory, involuntary interests would be superflu"embodies the essential attributes that run through all of the Court's decisions
defining a security."
Id. The Court later narrowly construed this footnote in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth,
471 U.S. 681 (1984). See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
54. See Daniel, 439 U.S. at 553 ("This case presents the question of whether a noncontributary, compulsory pension plan constitutes a 'security'
" (emphasis added)).
55. Id. at 560.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (footnote omitted). Nevertheless, the Court stated, "This is not to say that a person's 'investment,' in order to meet the definition of an investment contract, must take the
form of cash only, rather than of goods and services." Id. at 560 n.12 (citing United Hous.
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 n.16 (1975)).
59. Id. at 562.
60. Id.
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ous due to already existing ERISA regulation. 1 Finally, the Court
perceived a lack of congressional intent to subject pension plans to
coverage and noted prior SEC inaction. 2
Notably, the Court omitted any discussion of whether a sale of a
security for value occurred. The Court's discussion of the "investment" prong of the Howey test seems similar to an analysis of the
sale issue. However, because the Court held that the plan did not
constitute a security, it did not consider the question of whether, if
a security had been found, a sale for value took place sufficient to
render the transaction subject to the Securities Acts.6
Literal Application of the Securities Acts
The decision in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth6 4 represents a
significant departure from previous definitional cases, which had
relied on the Howey test. Landreth is important for three reasons:
first, the decision presents a literal application of the definitional
provisions of the Acts, with the Court utilizing a textual approach;
second, the case reveals the Court's current attitude towards the
Howey test; and third, the Court expressed a preference for certainty in the application of the securities laws, for deference to
congressional intent as evidenced by a literal reading of the Acts,
and for protection of reasonable expectations that the Acts apply
to stock.
In Landreth, the Court resolved the longstanding controversy of
whether the Securities Acts apply to the sale of a controlling block
of shares coupled with transfer of active management. A majority
of the previous cases had held that the sale of 100% of the stock of
a closely held corporation constitutes the sale of a business and
hence is not included within the definition of a security 65 Lower
61. See id. at 569-70 ("The existence of this comprehensive legislation governing the use
and terms of employee pension plans severely undercuts all arguments for extending the
Securities Acts to noncontributory, compulsory pension plans.").
62. Id. at 563-65.
63. Id. at 556-57 n.8; see also Ellen C. Kerrigan, Daniel: The Securities and Exchange
Commission in the Lion's Den, 4 GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 165, 169 n.24 (1981) (observing this
omission).
64. 471 U.S. 681 (1984).
65. See, e.g., Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982); King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342
(11th Cir. 1982); Chandler v. Kew, Inc., 691 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1977); Anchor-Darling
Indus. v. Suozzo, 510 F Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1981). A few courts, however, had rejected the

200
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courts had concluded that because the buyer of the business represents not a passive investor, but an active manager of the purchased business, no commonality of enterprise or significant reliance on the efforts of others exists. 6 The transaction therefore
fails the second and third prongs of the Howey test. Such a transaction, courts had held, does not involve an investment contract,
and therefore no security exists.6 7
The Supreme Court in Landreth rejected the sale of business
doctrine.6 Beginning its analysis by noting that "the starting point
in every case involving the construction of a statute is the language
itself,"69 the Court observed that the definitional provisions of the
1933 and 1934 Acts include the term "stock. ' 70 Standing alone,
however, the fact that the instrument bears the label "stock" is not
determinative.7 1 The Court believed that in order for the Acts to
apply, the instruments at issue must also possess the traditional
characteristics typically associated with stock, such as distribution
of dividends, appreciability, and voting rights.7 2 Because the shares
"sale of business" doctrine. See Cole v. PPG Indus., 680 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1982); Golden v.
Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982). See generally Thomas L. Hazen, Taking Stock of
Stock and the Sale of Closely Held Corporations:When Is Stock Not a Security?, 61 N.C.
L. REv. 393 (1983) (discussing and criticizing the sale of business doctrine).
66. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 684-85.
67. See infra note 78.
68. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 687-92.
69. Id. at 685 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975)
(Powell, J., concurring)).
70. Id. at 686; see supra note 39.
71. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686.

72. Id. The characteristics of stock that the Court listed, including "the right to receive
dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits," id., are the same as those it discussed in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975). In Forman,
the Court held that nontransferable, nonvoting, and nonappreciable interests in a nonprofit
low-income housing cooperative were not securities within the meaning of the Acts, despite
the fact that the parties to the transaction called the shares "stock." Id. at 856-58. The
Court rejected the contention that merely calling the instruments "stock" renders them subject to the Securities Acts. Id. at 848. The shares lacked what the Court deemed to be the
essential attributes of stock: negotiability, voting rights, dividends, ability to pledge or hypothecate, and appreciability. Id. at 851. However, the Court did not completely discount
the importance of the name given to the instrument by the parties:
[W]e do not suggest that the name is wholly irrelevant to the decision whether
it is a security. There may be occasions when the use of a traditional name
such as "stocks" or "bonds" will lead a purchaser justifiably to assume that the
federal securities laws apply. This would clearly be the case when the underly-
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that the plaintiffs had purchased obviously bore these characteristics, the Acts applied to the transaction. 3
One impetus behind the Court's textual approach was the notion
that parties buying or selling traditional stock reasonably expect
the Securities Acts to apply Because the sale of corporate stock "is
typical of the kind of context to which the Acts normally apply, it
is much more likely
that an investor would believe he was covered by the federal securities laws. '74 The Court later elaborated
75
on this notion of investor reliance in Reves v. Ernst & Young:
"[T]he public perception of common stock as the paradigm of a
security suggests that stock, in whatever context it is sold, should
be treated as within the ambit of the Acts. ' 6
The most significant aspect of the decision was the Court's refusal to apply the Howey test to the sale of a controlling block of
stock, a test that the Court, just five years before, had said "embodies the essential attributes that run through all of the Court's
decisions defining a security ",77 Indeed, had the Court applied the
ing transaction embodies some of the significant characteristics typically associated with the named instrument.
Id. at 850-51.
73. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 687.
74. Id. The analysis in Landreth parallels the Court's approach in Tcherepnin v. Knight,
389 U.S. 332 (1967), in which the Supreme Court considered whether withdrawable capital
shares of a savings and loan association were securities and therefore subject to the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act. Id. at 340. In finding that the shares were subject to the
Act, the Court did not rest its decision on application of the Howey test, stating,
"[I]nstruments may be included within any of [the Act's] definitions, as a matter of law, if
on their face they answer to the name or description." Id. at 339 (citations omitted). The
fact that the dividends were contingent upon profits was enough to render the shares
"stock." Id. The Court further characterized the shares as "certificates of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement," id., and as "transferable shares." Id.
75. 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
76. Id. at 62; see infra note 85. The Court in Forman similarly recognized the possibility
that the name and attributes of an instrument may induce reliance. See Forman, 421 U.S.
at 850-51; supra note 72.
77. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 n.11 (1979) (quoting
Forman, 421 U.S. at 852). In Landreth,the Court reasoned around this prior statement by
obliquely characterizing it as a "bit of dicta" and by claiming that the statement was made
only for "present purposes," and only to explain that the test for "investment contract"
might as well be the same as that for an "instrument commonly known as a 'security.'"
Landreth,471 U.S. at 691 n.5.
The Court, seeking to curtail universal application of the Howey test, nevertheless felt
compelled to respond to this assertion. That the Howey test applies in determining whether
an instrument qualifies as a security is the only possible interpretation of the statement,
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Howey test, transforming the transaction somehow into an investment contract as defined by that test would have been an almost
71
impossible feat of semantics.
Instead, the Court circumscribed application of the Howey test.
After Landreth, courts may resort to using the Howey criteria only
in cases involving unusual instruments that the other specifically
enumerated securities listed in the Acts do not describe. 79 Only
then should a court examine the economic reality of the underlying
transaction. 0
Motivated in part by deference to the perceived congressional
intent evidenced by the Acts' plain meaning, the Court held that
the Howey test applies only in determining whether an instrument
is an investment contract."' The Court explained that applying the

"[The test]
run[s] through all of the Court's decisions defining a security," especially as
it was made in Forman and Daniel. See Daniel, 439 U.S. at 558 n.11; Forman, 421 U.S. at
852. The Landreth Court desired to limit application of the test to only "unusual instruments," Landreth, 471 U.S. at 690, and was willing to recharacterize precedent to do it. For
the reasons why, see infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
78. See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 697-700 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the economic
substance of the transaction at issue dictates that it is not subject to the Acts). The transaction fails the commonality component of the test because a single purchaser is buying the
entire company. See Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459, 464 (7th Cir. 1981) ("Since
[the buyer] purchased all of the stock of [the business], there was no sharing or pooling of
funds."); Chandler v. Kew, Inc., 691 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1977). In addition, the purchaser of
the shares does not rely on the managerial or entrepreneurial efforts of others if he intends
to manage the enterprise himself. See Somogyi v. Butler, 518 F Supp. 970, 984 (D.N.J.
1981); Anchor-Darling Indus. v. Suozzo, 510 F Supp. 659, 663 (E.D. Pa. 1981); see also
Robert B. Thompson, The Shrinking Definition of a Security: Why Purchasing All of a
Company's Stock is Not a Federal Security Transaction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 225, 238-44
(1982) (discussing why the sale of a business fails the Howey test and reviewing cases that
have so held).
79. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 690.
80. Id. The Court stated:
All of the cases on which respondents rely involved unusual instruments not
easily characterized as "securities." Thus, if the Acts were to apply to those
cases at all, it would have been because the economic reality underlying the
transactions indicated that the instruments were actually of a type that falls
within the usual concept of a security. In the case at bar, in contrast, the instrument involved is traditional stock, plainly within the statutory definition.
There is no need here, as there was in the prior cases, to look beyond the
characteristics of the instrument to determine whether the Acts apply.
Id. (citation omitted).
81. Id. at 691-92.
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test to all the other instruments listed in the Acts "would make8' the
2
Acts' enumeration of many types of instruments superfluous.

Disdain for the Howey test is also apparent in the Court's observation that application of the Howey test in this context would
lead to uncertainty 83 With sales of less than 100% of a company's
stock, or with only limited voting and veto rights transferred, the
outcome of application of the Howey test would be largely unpredictable: "We find more daunting
the prospect that parties to a
transaction may never know they are covered by the Acts until
they engage in extended discovery and litigation over a concept as
elusive as the passage of control.

84

The Court eschews the fact-

specific nature of the test, and prefers to use a more predictable
means of resolving the definitional issue where possible.8 5
82. Id. at 692. Professor Rosin applauds the literal approach the Court took in Landreth
as consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers:
[T]he facial approach is rooted firmly in the doctrine of separation of powers
of the branches of the federal government. Whether Congress really meant
what it said-or even realized the implications of what it said-should not be a
matter for the judiciary. The Court should focus on Congress' actions. The end
result of the [Howey] functional approach is that it makes the statutory definition superfluous by substituting a judge-made unitary view of the nature of a
security for Congress' enumeration of a multiplicity of categories.
Rosin, supra note 41, at 361 (footnotes omitted).
83. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 696-97; see also Rosin, supra note 41, at 345.
84. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 696-97. The Court found that the value of certainty outweighed
the potential increased federal court workload because more items are now classified as securities. See id. at 696.
In Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985), the companion case to Landreth, the Court
consistently held that the sale of 50% of the stock of a company is nevertheless a sale of
"stock" and hence a transaction within the regulatory purview of the Acts. Id. at 704. The
Court once again emphasized the need for certainty. Applicability of the Acts should not
turn on vague and fact-specific variables as elusive as the extent of control transferred:
"[Tihe parties' inability to determine at the time of the transaction whether the Acts apply
neither serves the Acts' protective purpose nor permits the purchaser to compensate for the
added risk of no protection when negotiating the transaction." Id. at 706.
85. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990), the Court's most recent excursion into
the issue of what is the definition of a security, considered whether demand promissory
notes are securities and thus subject to the 1934 Act's antifraud requirements. The Court
explained that the literal approach of Landreth could not be so readily adopted to the sale
of notes as it could with stock-even though "notes" are listed in the Acts' definitional
provisions-because the term "note" "may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that
encompasses instruments with widely varying characteristics, depending on whether issued
in a consumer context, as commercial paper, or in some other investment context." Id. at 62
(citation omitted). However, the Court refused to apply the Howey test, stating that its use
is authorized only for determining whether an instrument is an "investment contract." Id.
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RECONCILING DANIEL AND LANDRETH

Landreth indicates that the Howey test no longer constitutes the
quintessential definition of a security The Howey test only determines whether an instrument qualifies as an investment contract.
A court must first examine the instrument and its characteristics
to determine whether it falls within one of the other specific categories listed in the definitional sections of the Acts. If it does, a
court must end its inquiry Only if it cannot readily characterize
the instrument should a court examine the economic substance of
the transaction, perhaps by way of the Howey criteria.86 This analytical approach furthers the Supreme Court's endorsement of deference to congressional intent, certainty in securities transactions,
and protection of reasonable expectations.
With these principles in mind, the Daniel decision warrants reexamination in light of Landreth. In Daniel, the Court confronted
an interest in a defined benefit pension plan and applied the
Howey criteria to determine whether the plan qualified as an investment contract.8 7 Landreth instructs that the test in Daniel applied only because the case involved "unusual instruments not easily characterized as 'securities.' "88 Because the pension interest in
Daniel did not fall readily into any of the definitional categories
at 64. The Court thus continued to relegate the Howey test to a very limited definitional
role.
Instead, the Court adopted the four-pronged "family resemblance" test to determine
whether notes are securities. Id. at 64-67. That the Court extolled the virtues of consistency
and predictability by merely exchanging one fact-specific test for another seems incongruous. However, the widely disparate characteristics of notes and their myriad uses results in
some inevitable uncertainty in resolving the definitional status of a particular note. Id. The
term "note" may indicate routine consumer financing, short-term debt secured by accounts
receivable, or true investment vehicles. Id. Moreover, the "family resemblance" test as
adopted begins with the rebuttable presumption that every note is a security. Id. Although
this presumption perhaps does little to lend actual certainty by itself, it is at least evidence
of the Court's continued emphasis on the objective of applying the Securities Acts in as
consistent and as predictable a manner as possible.
86. Or in the case of notes, by way of the "family resemblance" test. Id. at 65.
87. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558-62 (1979).
88. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 690. Of course, the Court applied the Howey test in Daniel
because the test contained "the essential attributes that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security." Daniel, 439 U.S. at 558 n.11. Now, however, the Howey test
should be used only to determine whether an interest is an "investment contract." See
Reves, 494 U.S. at 64; Landreth, 471 U.S. at 691; supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
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listed in the Acts, the Court applied the Howey test to determine
whether the pension interest was an investment contract.8 9
The Court in Daniel possibly could have characterized the pension interest as an item enumerated in the Acts. Specifically, the
interest could have been a "certificate of interest or participation
in any profit-sharing agreement," as Daniel himself attempted to
argue.9 0 After all, the Court in Tcherepnin v. Knight" relied on
this language in the 1934 Act to find capital shares to be
securities. 2
A pension interest, however, is an income-deferral arrangement.93 The primary purpose of a pension plan is to provide a

89. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
90. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 558 n.11. The Court refuted this contention, essentially by stating
that if the interest is not an investment contract, it is not a "certificate of interest in any
profit-sharing agreement." Id. The Howey test, in the Daniel Court's view, applied to both
types of instruments. Id., see supra note 53. At least two courts, relying on this language,
have followed the same reasoning. See Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 627
F. Supp. 1143, 1157 (D.D.C. 1986); Tanuggi v. Grolier, 471 F Supp. 1209, 1213 n.5 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) ("In the context of a pension plan, the terms 'investment contract' and 'certificate of
interest
' have substantially the same meaning." (citing Daniel, 439 U.S. at 558 n.11)).
The Court now rejects universal application of the Howey test. Reves, 494 U.S. at 64;
Landreth,471 U.S. at 692. However, for the reasons discussed here, an interest in a pension
plan cannot be characterized as a "certificate of interest in any profit-sharing agreement"
under the literal approach either.
91. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
92. Id. at 339; see supra note 74.
93. See Hearings on S. 3598 [ERISA] before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate
Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 231 (1972) (testimony of Manuel
Cohen, SEC Chairman) ("Realistically, the employee is simply putting into a fund for his
future use that which he would otherwise get in his paycheck
"); Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, H.R. RaP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.CAN. 4639, 4651 ("[ERISA] presumes that promised pension benefits are in the
form of a conditional deferred wage."); see also Stephen J. Nording, The Impact of the
Daniel Litigation: Growing Interest in Pension Vesting and Investment Control, 1979 Wis.
L. Rav. 1228. Nording argues that pension interests should be viewed as a means of deferring income, despite preconditions to vesting.
Realistically, employees view future pension benefits as deferred income which
is conditioned on their efforts to meet the plan's vesting requirements. For
example, when faced with a decision to change employers, an employee factors
pension benefits into his job choice. He faces the possible loss of future pension
benefits upon leaving his former employer, and weighs this loss against the
benefits provided by his new employer.
Id. at 1236 (footnotes omitted).
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source of secure income to employees after retirement.9 4 Retirement payments from a defined benefit pension plan come largely
from employer contributions. 5 The plan's investment income
serves merely to determine the amount of these employer contributions. The employer is required to increase contributions to cover
any shortfalls in plan earnings.96 The pension interest in Daniel,
therefore, was not a meaningful interest in a "profit-sharing agreement" as the plaintiff argued;97 the plan participant expected to
receive deferred compensation derived primarily from employer
contributions, not from profits.
For the same reason, an interest in a defined benefit pension
plan fails to qualify as an investment contract. The Court in
Daniel held that the pension interest failed the Howey test" because the plan's income came primarily from employer contributions and because the realization of benefits depended on meeting
the plan's eligibility requirements, rather than on the plan's
profitability 99
Admittedly, the Court in Daniel also found that the pension interest at issue failed the "investment of money" prong of the
Howey test because the interest in the plan was involuntary and

94. ERISA itself was enacted to make pension plans "fairer and more effective in providing retirement income for employees
" H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974).
95. A pension plan may also be a defined contribution plan, which provides separate accounts for each participant. Payable benefits are dependent on the value of that account at
the time of payment. In contrast, a defined benefit plan pays benefits that are fixed or
determinable; employer contributions vary in order to meet defined benefit requirements.
Participants in defined benefit plans can count on receiving a predetermined level of benefits regardless of the plan's investment performance. Participants in defined contribution
plans bear the risk of a reduction in value of the plan's assets because the employer's contributions to the plan are fixed. See Richard D. Brown, UnderstandingERISA: An Introduction to Basic Employee Benefits-Pension and Profit Sharing Plans Distinguished, 302
PRAcT. L. INST. TAX 99, 113 (1990).
96. See Marilyn J. W Ford, The Aftermath of Daniel: Private Pension Plans, ERISA,
and the Federal Antifraud Provisions, 46 Mo. L. REv. 51, 64 (1981). With a defined benefit
plan, benefits are received independent of market fluctuations; otherwise, the purpose of the
plan to provide future income security would be frustrated. Id. at 64-65. Although defined
contribution plans are also designed to provide for retirement, they do not afford the same
guarantee of definite payments and are riskier. Id. at 65.
97. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 562 (1979).
98. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
99. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 562.
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noncontributory 100 However, even if a plan is voluntary and contributory, such that an investment decision does take place under
the Howey test, an interest in the typical pension plan still would
not be a security According to lower court decisions subsequent to
Daniel, the fact that an interest in a defined benefit plan lacks
investment risk is sufficient in itself to place it outside the scope of
the Acts. 1' 1 For pension plans, the definitional issue therefore does
not turn primarily on whether the plan is voluntary or involuntary,
or contributory or noncontributory The critical factor is whether
the instrument possesses the usual investment characteristics of a
security as embodied in the "expectation of profits" prong of the
Howey test. 2
Under the principles the Court enunciated in Landreth, courts
should now properly understand Daniel as having applied the
Howey test only because the interest in the pension plan at issue
did not fall neatly into the category of a "certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement" or any other enumerated instrument. An interest in an employee stock ownership
plan, however, differs significantly from the pension interest in
Daniel.

100. Id. at 560; see supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
101. See Coward v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 686 F.2d 1230, 1237 (7th Cir. 1982); Cunha v.
Ward Foods, Inc., 545 F Supp. 94 (D. Hawaii 1982). The court in Cunha intimated, however, that a defined contribution plan might warrant a different result. Id. at 100 n.6; see
also O'Neil v. Marriott Corp., 538 F Supp. 1026, 1031 (D. Md. 1982); Tanuggi v. Grolier,
Inc., 471 F Supp. 1209, 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that an interest in a voluntary, contributory plan is not a security because "the fact that such participation is voluntary and
involves giving up specific consideration
does not make the absence of the profit characteristic less conspicuous."); Newkirk v. General Elec. Co., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,216, at 96,632 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 31, 1979).
102. See Black v. Payne, 591 F.2d 83, 87 (1979) (holding that the "expectation of profits"
prong is the "critical factor"); Newkirk, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 97,216, at 96,632; see also Kerrigan, supra note 63, at 175-76.
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EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS EXAMINED

ESOPs
An employee stock ownership plan is a tax-qualified °3 employee
benefit plan 01T designed to enable employees to acquire stock ownership interests in their employers. ESOPs are variously used as
"technique[s] of corporate finance,"' 0 5 as a means of improving
employee productivity, 0 6 and as antitakeover devices. 0 7 An interest in an employee stock ownership plan is essentially an interest
in a pool of employer stock, managed by a trustee for the benefit of
103. See 26 U.S.C. § 401 (1986). If an ESOP meets the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA, it is "tax-qualified" and can be the source of various deductions. The
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, at Section 4975(e)(7), defines an ESOP as a defined contribution stock bonus plan designed to invest primarily in qualifying employer securities. For a
comparison of defined benefit and defined contribution plans, see supra notes 95-96.
104. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3)
(1988) (defining an ESOP as an "eligible individual account plan").
105. See 129 CONG. REC. 33820, 33821 (1983) (statement of Sen. Long) (proposing the
Employee Stock Ownership Act of 1983); see infra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
Because of the highly favorable tax treatment accorded such plans, a leveraged ESOP, or an
ESOP whose shares are bought with borrowed funds, can increase capitalization, refinance
outstanding debt, or acquire productive assets much less expensively than with ordinary
financing. See generally Henry C. Blackiston, III et al., ESOPs: What They Are and How
They Work, 45 Bus. LAW. 85 (1989) (describing various uses of ESOPs); Roger C. Siske,
Employee Stock Ownership Plans, 528 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 371 (1990) (describing various uses of
ESOPs). The Internal Revenue Service has accepted Senator Long's characterization of ESOPs as "techniques of corporate finance." See Rev. Rul. 79-122, 1979 C.B. 204, 206. For a
discussion and critique of leveraged ESOPs, see Levin, supra note 4.
106. By aligning the interests of labor and management, ESOPs theoretically boost
worker productivity and morale. Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257,
272 (Del. Ch. 1989). Empirical studies, however, are generally inconclusive. Compare D.
Thomas Livingston & James B. Henry, The Effect of Employee Stock Ownership Plans on
Corporate Profits, 47 J. RISK & INS. 491 (1980) (finding that ESOP companies are less profitable) with Thomas R. Marsh & Dale E. McAllister, ESOP Tables: A Survey of Companies
with Employee Stock Ownership Plans, 6 J. CORP. L. 551 (1981) (showing that ESOP companies have higher productivity) and Corey Rosen & Michael Quarry, How Well Is Employee Ownership Working?, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1987, at 126 (reporting that ESOPs
exert a positive influence on employee behavior).
107. ESOPs enable companies threatened by takeover to place large blocks of stock in
hands perceived to be friendly and sympathetic to management. See Shamrock Holdings,
559 A.2d at 269-72 (characterizing the particular use of a defensive ESOP as fundamentally
fair to Polaroid's shareholders and employees); O'Toole, supra note 5, at 837 n.19. See generally Margaret E. McLean, Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Corporate Takeovers:
Restraints on the Use of ESOPs by Corporate Officers and Directors to Avert Hostile
Takeovers, 10 PEPP. L. REv. 731 (1983) (discussing ESOP takeover implications).
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employees. 10 8 A business typically forms a leveraged ESOP, or an
ESOP funded with borrowed money, as a way of raising tax-subsidized capital. 10 9 Although specific ESOP characteristics may vary,
the typical leveraged ESOP transaction occurs as follows. 110
Assume a corporation wishes to raise fifty million dollars for
plant and equipment acquisition. It establishes a qualified ESOP
trust with a written trust agreement. The ESOP borrows fifty million dollars from a bank and then uses the proceeds of the loan to
purchase stock from the sponsoring employer. The ESOP holds the
shares in a suspense account as collateral for the loan and each
participating employee holds an account in the plan. When the
company makes contributions to the ESOP, the ESOP will use
those contributions to pay the principal and interest on the loan or
to buy additional shares of stock. As either the company or the
ESOP pays off the loan, the bank releases the shares held in the
suspense account from encumbrance and allocates them to individual accounts. An allocation is based on the ratio of the participant's compensation to the total compensation of all participating
employees."' Dividend income from the acquired securities is also
individually allocated."12 In addition, participants acquire voting
rights when the stock is credited to their accounts." 3
Depending on the vesting method used, the employee's interest
in the ESOP usually vests completely after five years and thereafter becomes nonforfeitable." 4 If a participant's service with the
employer terminates, the percentage actually vested remains nonforfeitable, and the participant forfeits any nonvested percentage."15 Distributions normally occur no later than one year after
108. Siske, supra note 105, at 372.

109. Id.
110. The following scenario is a composite of examples from Blackiston, supra note 105,
at 126, and Luis L. Granados, Employee Stock Ownership Plans: An Analysis of Current
Reform Proposals,14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 15, 22-24 (1980), and assumes that the hypothetical
employer wishes the plan to be tax qualified.
111. 26 U.S.C. § 4975 (Supp. II 1990).
112. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-11(d)(3) (as amended in 1979).
113. 26 U.S.C. § 409(e)(2).
114. Id. § 411(a)(2). Vesting requirements of a plan may vary and still be tax qualified.
115. For rules on allocation, see Treas. Reg. § 1.401(b)(ii)-(iii) (1986); 26 C.F.R. § 54.497511(d) (1989). See generally Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 511 (1981)
(declaring certain guidelines for determining proper allocation of ERISA nonforfeitable

benefits).
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the last day of the plan year in which retirement, disability, or
death occurs.' 16 After vesting, however, an employee may request
an in-service distribution of stock already allocated to that partici117
pant's account.
For the ESOP to be tax qualified under the Internal Revenue
Code, an employee must have the choice of either receiving benefits in cash, based on the fair market value of the stock, or receiving shares of the stock directly.1 8 Plan distributions, however,
often take the form of employer stock." 9
A participant in a tax-qualified ESOP possesses complete passthrough voting rights if the employer's securities trade on the public markets.2 With respect to privately held stock, the plan may
limit voting rights to the right to direct the vote on any merger or
consolidation, recapitalization, reclassification, liquidation, or sale
of substantially all of the assets of a trade or business.' 2 ' On all
other matters, the ESOP trustee will vote the stock held by the
plan. If the plan limits participants' voting rights, however, the financial institution that lends to an ESOP will not be entitled to
the fifty percent interest exclusion.'2 2
Comparing ESOPs to Conventional Pension Plans
ERISA describes an ESOP as a defined contribution plan.' 2 3 The
benefits under the plan depend entirely upon the underlying value

116. 26 U.S.C. § 409(o)(1)(A).
117. Id. § 411.
118. Id. §§ 409(h), 4975(e)(7).

119. See Siske, supra note 105, at 372. A leveraged ESOP is unlikely to have cash with
which to pay the fair market value of the stock and often must make a distribution in stock
as a matter of practical necessity. See Michael J. Nassau, Plans That Invest in Employer
Securities: ESOPs, Stock Bonus Plans, and Eligible IRAs, 302 PRAc. L. INsT. TAX. 857, 867
(1990).
120. 26 U.S.C. §§ 409(e), 4975(e)(7). The participant's interest need not vest in order for
him to acquire voting rights, as employees may vote stock that is held in the suspense account. Id. § 409(e)(3). Most ESOPs provide for the trustee to vote the unallocated shares in
the same proportion as the employees have voted their allocated shares. See O'Toole, supra
note 5, at 828-29.
121. 26 U.S.C. § 409(e)(3).
122. Id. § 133(b)(7). Financial institutions which lend funds to a tax-qualified ESOP trust
are permitted to exclude 50% of the interest income derived from the loan. See infra note
132.
123. 26 U.S.C. § 4975(e)(7); see supra notes 103-04.
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of the employer's stock. Unlike defined benefit plans, in which investment performance has little or no effect upon the amount of
the benefit to be paid, the entire risk of the plan falls on employee
participants. 124 This fact distinguishes ESOPs from conventional
defined benefit pension plans in that pensions are compensatory in
nature. 12 5 In contrast, ESOPs are actually speculative investment
opportunities for employees. 2 6
Although an ESOP does, in a very limited sense, defer compensation until retirement, it primarily provides employees with ownership interests in their employer. 1 27 The utility of an ESOP in
providing for retirement is very limited. Other forms of employee
benefit plans are far superior to ESOPs at providing retirement
security. As an investment vehicle, ESOPs lack liquidity and asset
diversification; they hold only one asset, the employer's stock, for
investment.'2 " Rather, the purpose of an ESOP is to present em-

124. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
126. Commentators have recognized this distinction. One practitioner has argued that
what he terms an "investment securities plan" should not be confused with a "compensatory securities plan." Stanley Keller, Employee Equity Incentive Arrangements, REV. SEC.
& CoM. REG., June 25, 1986, at 156, 156. An investment securities plan is primarily a means
of generating operating capital, whereas a compensatory stock plan's purpose is to benefit
employees. Id. Keller asserts that participants in investment securities plans should have
access to the type of information that the 1933 Act requires to be disclosed. Id.; see also
Robert Duke, Employee Stock Option Plans Under the Securities Acts: A Time for Reexamination, 38 Bus. LAW. 1429, 1433-34 (1983) (recognizing distinction between employee
stock option plans, which are compensatory in nature, and employee stock purchase plans,
which are used for investment purposes).
127. See Mario L. Baeza & Laura A. Taylor, The Applicability of the Federal Securities
Laws to Employee Bargained-ForESOPs, 680 PRAC. L. INST. CORP. 703, 708 (1990).
The substitution of an ESOP for compensation the employee would otherwise
have been entitled to receive in cash is not likely to produce future compensation for the employee actuarially (or otherwise) equivalent in value to the foregone cash compensation.... [A]n employee could receive much less than the
foregone compensation if the company performs poorly. This risk factor makes
the substitution of the ESOP resemble much more the acquisition of an equity interest in a company than an ordinary deferred compensation
arrangement.
Id. (emphasis added).
128. See Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms,
Codetermination,and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1799 (1990) (criticizing
ESOPs for this very reason); Levin, supra note 4, at 168 (same); see also McLean, supra
note 107, at 743. The author lists the disadvantages of ESOPs from the employee's perspective: "1) an ESOP inevitably results in a high concentration of trust assets in the stock of a
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ployees with a meaningful opportunity to share in the company's
future earnings, to have some voice in corporate governance, and to
own capital wealth. 12 9 When Congress provided preferential tax
treatment to ESOP formation, it did so in order to broaden the
base of capital ownership in this country, 130 not to provide a new,
unnecessary, and inadequate source of employee savings. Indications exist that congressional sponsors of ESOPs placed them
coverage of ERISA largely for reasons of
under the regulatory 31
convenience.'
practical
ESOPs as "Certificates of Interest or Participationin" Stock
Establishing an ESOP, like floating new issues of stock, is a
method of raising capital. Moreover, ESOPs are a relatively cheap
method of capital formation, because Congress has provided gener-

single corporation; 2) the employer's stock may not be a desirable investment for an employee's trust; and 3) the flexibility of a managed portfolio is lacking in an ESOP." Id.
Note that ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (Supp. II 1990), imposes a duty on the ESOP
trustee to act prudently. Professor McLean questions whether a trustee of an ESOP investing in a financially unsound corporation acts prudently. See McLean, supra note 107, at 743
n.72.
129. ESOPs enable employees "to share in the ownership of corporate capital and in the
growth and profitability of the employer." S. REP. No. 36, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1975).
Admittedly, companies often establish ESOPs with other goals in mind. A business may
form an ESOP as an antitakeover defense or as a means of raising tax-advantaged capital.
See supra notes 105-07. These purposes are, of course, not inconsistent with application of
the securities laws. Whether a corporation issues stock to raise capital or to deter a takeover
attempt, it undertakes a transaction subject to the Securities Acts.
130. The legislative record strongly suggests that Congress' primary motivation in establishing the leveraged ESOP program was to alleviate the disparity of wealth distribution in
the United States economy. Senator Russell Long, principal supporter and architect of the
ESOP program, attacked the high concentration of capital ownership in America: "A continuing fundamental weakness of our system is that so many Americans own so very little while
a relative few Americans own a great deal." 129 CONG. REC. 33813 (1983) (statement of Sen.
Long). The Senator argued that America has only a "scanty sprinkling of capitalists," with
highly concentrated holdings in capital wealth. Id. He decried the observation that "[m]ost
working Americans owe rather than own [and] accumulate debts rather than assets." Id. at
33817.
131. See Employee Ownership on Hostile Takeovers: Hearings on S.1323 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1987) (statement of former Sen. Long) (asserting that the reason the ESOP legislation appeared in the
tax and pension area was because he served on the Finance Committee; if he were on the
Armed Services Committee instead, ESOPs would be tied to government contracts);
Granados, supra note 110, at 48-49 (suggesting that the ESOP provisions' position in the
tax code is due to Senator Long's chairmanship of the Senate Finance Committee).
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ous tax incentives that attend the establishment of ESOPs." 2 If a
company needs to raise new capital, it can do so much less expensively by selling stock to employees through the ESOP device, and
taking advantage of these various tax subsidies, rather than
through a public offering. By allowing companies to use ESOPs as
techniques of corporate finance,'-3 Congress sought to encourage
the formation of ESOPs by employers who otherwise would not
create them.13 4 Absent these favorable tax incentives to use ESOPs
as tools of finance, employers would most likely forego establishing
ESOPs on a widespread scale.'- 3
In short, an interest in an ESOP amounts to an interest in stock.
An ESOP is simply a tax-preferred means by which companies sell
stock to employees in order to raise capital. ESOPs are in reality
not income-deferral devices, but equity investment vehicles. In
sharp contrast to employees who participate in pension plans,
those who participate in ESOPs actually become equity investors

132. In addition to the usual tax advantages of employee benefit plans such as employer
contribution deductions, 26 U.S.C. § 404(a) (Supp. II 1990), employee deferral of accumulated income, id. § 402(a), and exemption of the ESOP trust from taxation of earnings, id. §
501(a), (c)(17), an ESOP enjoys other substantial tax incentives not available to other plans.
These tax incentives make ESOPs a very attractive means of raising capital. A financial
institution lending money to an ESOP may exclude from gross income 50% of the interest
received therefrom. 26 U.S.C. § 133. For the institution to receive this partial exclusion, the
ESOP must own 50% or more of the stock of the sponsoring employer, id. § 133(b)(6)(A),
the term of the loan cannot exceed 15 years, id. § 133(b)(1), and complete voting rights must
pass through to all employees. Id. § 133(b)(7). The effect of the 50% exclusion is to reduce
the cost of ESOP borrowing, as lenders will presumably pass some of the tax savings on to
ESOPs. In addition, a sponsoring employer may deduct any contributions used to repay
principal or interest on an ESOP loan, up to 25% of total compensation paid to ESOP
participants. Id. § 404(a)(9)(A). Another incentive is that a sponsoring employer may deduct
dividends paid on allocated shares, whether paid directly to participants or used to make
payments on an ESOP loan. Id. § 404(k). Finally, shareholders may under certain circumstances defer tax on the gain on employer securities sold to an ESOP if they subsequently
reinvest the proceeds. Id. § 1042(c)(3), (4). For a more detailed treatment of tax benefits
applicable to ESOPs, see David Ackerman, Innovative Uses of Employee Stock Ownership
Plans for Private Companies, 2 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 227, 233-45 (1990).
A study conducted by the Office of Management and Budget in 1985 estimated that the
total cost to the Treasury of ESOP tax subsidies would be $2.5 billion in 1986, increasing to
at least $4.4 billion in 1990. John Hoerr, ESOPs:Revolution or Ripoff?., Bus. WK., Apr. 15,
1985, at 94.
133. See S. REP. No. 36, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1975).
134. See 129 CONG. REc. 33820 (1983) (statement of Sen. Long).
135. Although used and promoted since the 1950s, ESOPs did not become popular until
tax subsidies first appeared in 1974. See Hansmann, supra note 128, at 1797.
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in a single enterprise, bearing all the usual risks of common stock
ownership. ESOPs possess the traditional characteristics associated with stock, including that which the Supreme Court deemed
most important in Tcherepnin v. Knight"6 and United Housing
3
Foundation,Inc. v. Forman:1
7 the right to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits. 138 The vesting of ESOP
participants' interests entitles them to receive those shares allocated to their accounts, regardless of whether they continue in the
company's employ until retirement. A vested ESOP interest therefore possesses all of the salient characteristics of traditional stock
emphasized in Forman: voting rights, appreciability, the ability to
pledge or hypothecate, and negotiability." 9 The Securities Acts literally apply to an interest in an employee stock ownership plan as
a "certificate of interest or participation in" stock. 4 °
Admittedly, particular vesting requirements of an ESOP may
vary, with some plans imposing more stringent preconditions to
vesting than others. The chance that an employee might fail to
meet vesting requirements should not, however, cloud the issue of
whether an interest in an ESOP is a security within the meaning of
the Acts. Rather, the possibility of forfeiture relates to the sale issue, not to the security issue. Specifically, conditional vesting
raises the issue of whether a sale of a security has taken place
when an employee accepts a wage reduction in return for a security-a "certificate of interest or participation in" stock-when
complete ownership of the underlying stock is contingent on fulfilling vesting requirements.'' For purposes of clarity, however, the
two analyses should remain distinct.
Properly understood, an ESOP is simply a vehicle through which
an employer sells stock to employees. A court need not resort to
the Howey-Daniel test in order to resolve the definitional question.
As the Supreme Court held in Reves, "the public perception of
common stock as the paradigm of a security suggests that stock, in
whatever context it is sold, should be treated as within the ambit

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

389 U.S. 332 (1967).
421 U.S. 387 (1975).
Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 339; see supra notes 72, 74 and accompanying text.
Forman, 421 U.S. at 851; see supra note 72 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(1), 78c(a)(10) (Supp. 11 1990); see supra note 39.
See infra notes 313-19 and accompanying text.
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of the Acts."' 4 2 That the tax laws label ESOPs "pension plans"
should not disguise their true nature.'4 3
CASE LAW TREATMENT OF THE DEFINITIONAL STATUS OF

ESOPs

Five cases have considered the definitional status of ESOPs.
Two utilized the Howey-Daniel test with conflicting outcomes:
Childers v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.'"' and Uselton v. Commercial
Lovelace Motor Freight.4 5 Both cases arose after Landreth Tim47
ber Co. v. Landreth.'4 , One pre-Landreth case, Bauman v. Bish,
did not refer to the Howey-Daniel criteria explicitly, but relied on
InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel148 in holding
that no sale had taken place with respect to ESOP interests. 49
Hood v. Smith's Transfer Corp. 50 and Harris v. Republic Airlines, Inc.,' 51 serve as a basis for comparison, representing the best
method of analyzing whether ESOPs are securities within the
meaning of the Acts.
Cases Applying Howey-Daniel Analysis
In Childers v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,'5 2 the plaintiffs, members of a union, had agreed to a fifteen percent wage reduction in
exchange for an interest in an ESOP.'5 ' A few years after reaching
a collective bargaining agreement, the employer refused the plaintiffs their benefits because promotions supposedly rendered them

142. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 62 (1990) (emphasis added) (citing Landreth
Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 693 (1984)).
143. See Granados, supra note 110, at 49 ("[T]he ESOP is not and was never intended to
be primarily a tax gimmick. The ESOP is much more than that-it is a way of restructuring
).
the system of capital credit ....
144. 688 F. Supp. 1357 (D. Minn. 1988).
145. 940 F.2d 564 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 589 (1991).
146. 471 U.S. 681 (1984).
147. 571 F. Supp. 1054 (N.D. W. Va. 1983).
148. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
149. Bauman, 571 F. Supp. at 1063.
150. 762 F. Supp. 1274 (W.D. Ky. 1991).
93,772 (D.D.C. May 18,
151. [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1988).
152. 688 F. Supp. 1357 (D. Minn. 1988).
153. Id. at 1359.

WILLIAM AND

MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:189

alleged a vioineligible to participate in the plan.15 The plaintiffs
155
lation of the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act.
Without discussing the differences between ESOPs and pension
plans, and without referring to Landreth, the district court analyzed the issue by comparing the ESOP to the pension plan in
Daniel and consequently applied the Howey-Daniel test. 5 The
court found that participation in the plan was compulsory because
the union put the issue to a majority vote. 57 Thus, the "collective
bargaining agreements bound all union members regardless of
whether they supported the [wage-ESOP swap],"'' 58 and so the
plan failed the investment prong of the test. The plan also failed
the expectation of profits prong' 59 because, in the court's view, the
participants did not expect profits from the efforts of the fund's
managers: 160 "The ESOPs were funded only with Republic stock,
which the ESOPs' managers were not free to trade. Thus, any appreciation in the value of the stock would not be attributable to
the management of the ESOPs but to the financial recovery of Republic as a whole."'"' The court also believed that the ESOPs represented a method of deferring income, and "not a method of reducing wages to pay for stock."' 62
With analogous facts, the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite
63
conclusion in Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight.'
The plaintiff-employees agreed to a seventeen percent reduction in
wages due under the union's collective bargaining agreement in exchange for an interest in a leveraged ESOP.16 Instead of collectively participating, all of the union members individually elected
to participate in the plan.' 65 The district court found that the in-

154. Id.
155. Id. at 1362.
156. Id. at 1363. The court began its analysis with the observation, "[T]he list of numerous examples in the statutory definition does not include ESOPs." Id. at 1362.
157. Id.
158. Id.; see also supra note 55 and accompanying text.
159. Childers, 688 F. Supp. at 1363; see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
160. Childers, 688 F. Supp. at 1363.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. 940 F.2d 564 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 589 (1991).
164. Id. at 570.
165. Id.
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terests in the plan were not investment contracts and dismissed
the plaintiffs' securities fraud claims.166 The court of appeals, although also applying the Howey-Daniel test, reversed the
16 7
decision.
Unlike the district court in- Childers, the Tenth Circuit found
wage reductions sufficiently contributory to pass muster under the
investment prong of the test. 68 In addition, the court found the
plan voluntary because "each such employee had the option of either accepting [Commercial Lovelace's] wage reduction program or
of continuing employment under the terms of the existing union
contract."' 6 9 Had the employer required that employees vote collectively to participate in the plan, as the company in Childers had
would not have been voluntary under the Howeydone, the plan
70
Daniel test.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit also contradicted the
district court in Childers in its application of the third prong,
whether participants expected profits from the efforts of others.
The court wrote:
Both of these requirements [expected profits and efforts of
others] are met in this case because any profit on plaintiffs'
ESOP interest would occur through dividend distributions and
appreciation in the value of stock allocated to their accounts,
which in both cases would result primarily from the efforts of
CL's managers and its employees .... This fact distinguishes
the CL ESOP from other voluntary, contributory employee ben7
efit plans that have failed this final prong of the Howey test.' '
Because the ESOP satisfied all three prongs of the Howey test, the
investment contracts and, therecourt deemed the ESOP interests
72
fore, subject to the Acts.'
166. Id. at 571.
167. Id. at 573. The court of appeals indicated, however, that it might have found the
Securities Acts applicable under the literal approach had the parties addressed the issue on
appeal. Id. at 575 n.4.
168. Id. at 575. "[T]he transaction . . .required plaintiffs and Lee Way's other union
employees to surrender a portion of the wages due them under a valid collective bargaining
agreement in exchange for an interest in the [Commercial Lovelace] ESOP ...." Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 576-77 (citations omitted).
172. Id. at 573-84.
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Bauman v. Bish" concerned the largest ESOP in existence at
the time. 174 The plaintiffs sought to force their employer to register
the ESOP with the SEC and to disclose material information, pursuant to the 1933 Act, before they collectively agreed to participate
in the plan.'7 5 They also claimed damages for alleged material
omissions connected with a solicitation to purchase stock that violated the antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act. 176 Under the proposed deal, the employer would have required its employees to accept reductions in wages in return for interests in a leveraged
77
ESOP.1
The district court first labelled the ESOP a noncontributory, involuntary pension plan without explaining what factors rendered
the plan involuntary.1 7 1 In addition, the court believed that 7 the
proposed ESOP was primarily a method of deferring income. 1 It
did recognize, however, that an ESOP is not the functional
equivalent of a regular pension plan; therefore, "the Daniel decision, while providing guidance on the issue, [was] not viewed as
dispositive."' 8 0
The court instead relied on Daniel, not to determine whether
the ESOP was an investment contract, but to determine whether a
sale for value would have taken place via the investment prong of
the Howey test.' 8' The court found the ESOP interest was involuntary, despite the fact that the plaintiffs had sued in order to decide
whether to vote to participate in the plan. Further, the court held
the ESOP interest to be noncontributory, despite the specific percentage wage reduction. Based on these two conclusions, no sale of
a security for value would have occurred.8 2 The court did not even

173. 571 F. Supp. 1054 (N.D. W. Va. 1983).
174. Id. at 1056.
175. Id. at 1057, 1062. Offering to sell a security absent registration with the SEC is unlawful. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1988); see supra note 29.
176. Bauman, 571 F. Supp. at 1062.
177. Id. at 1057.
178. Id. at 1063.
179. Id. at 1064.
180. Id. at 1063.
181. Id. at 1064.
182. Id.
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consider the more fundamental question of whether the ESOP interest at issue qualified as a security. 8 3
Critique of the Howey-Daniel. Approach
These cases reveal the deficiencies of the Howey-Daniel test as
applied to ESOPs. Application of the Howey-Daniel criteria to interests in ESOPs does not comport with congressional intent, inevitably results in uncertainty and unpredictability, fails to protect
employees' expectations, and is contrary to Landreth Timber Co.
v. Landreth.'
Specific wage reductions in exchange for participation in ESOPs
confronted all three courts, yet the courts reached conflicting results. The courts in Childers and Bauman found specific wage reductions noncontributory, whereas the court in Uselton found the
plan contributory. The approach in Uselton is more defensible, but
arguably it is inconsistent with Daniel.8 5
Under the investment prong of the Howey-Daniel test, the court
in Childers found participation involuntary despite the fact that a
majority of union members affirmatively voted to participate in the
plan."8 " Although consistent with Daniel, the court's reasoning is
problematic. The opinion does not reveal the exact percentage of
members who voted to participate in the ESOP, but the court's
analysis, if extended to what must be its logical conclusion, would
indicate that if all members had unanimously voted to participate,
then the plan would have been sufficiently voluntary. Somewhere
between bare majority and unanimous approval lies the demarca-

183. The court also relied on Daniel for the proposition that ERISA takes the ESOP
interest out of the regulatory purview of the Acts. Id. at 1064-65.
184. 471 U.S. 681 (1984).
185. The plaintiff in Daniel had voted on a collective bargaining agreement that chose
employer contributions to the pension fund in lieu of receiving other wages or benefits. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 557 (1979). The plaintiff in Daniel
therefore had relinquished higher wages, albeit an undefined percentage, in exchange for a
pension interest. The Court nevertheless held that Daniel made no payment into the fund
sufficient to find an investment. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text. That the
wage reduction in Uselton was specifically expressed in percentage form is arguably an irrelevant distinction under the first prong of the investment contract test.
186. Childers v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1357, 1363 (D. Minn. 1988)
("[C]ollective bargaining agreements bound all union members regardless of whether they
supported the [wage-ESOP swap].").
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tion between voluntary and involuntary; exactly where is left to a
case-by-case determination. 117 Application of the Securities Acts
should not depend on the relative strength of a voting majority,
because this variable is as elusive as the extent of control transferred in the sale of a business. 18 Because of its inherent uncertainty, use of the Howey-Daniel test should be avoided if the Securities Acts are capable of literal application.
In Bauman, the court used the investment prong of the HoweyDaniel test to determine whether a sale had taken place, not to
determine whether a security existed.8 9 This approach finds no
support in Daniel. The Supreme Court in Daniel never considered
the issue of whether a sale or an offer of sale of a security had
occurred within the meaning of the 1933 and 1934 Acts because it
never found the existence of a security in the first place. 90 This
approach, moreover, is plagued with the same deficiencies associated with voluntariness, a concept which, resting on unworkable
distinctions between voluntary and involuntary, is too elusive to
afford meaningful predictive value in the context of collectively
bargained-for ESOPs.
Using the investment prong of the Howey-Daniel test to ascertain the existence of a sale also ignores the fact that the 1933 Act's
registration requirements are triggered merely upon an offer of securities; a completed sale is not a prerequisite.' 9 ' The court in
Bauman apparently overlooked or ignored this facet of the 1933
Act, focusing instead on whether the employees would have purchased a security when participation was to be put to a collective

187. See Baeza & Taylor, supra note 127, at 708.
Where it may make some sense to find "individualized" decisions lacking
where only 51% of a bargaining unit votes in favor of a collective bargaining
agreement that includes a trade-off and the ESOP/wage reduction arrangement is "involuntarily" imposed on the other 49%, the question is a much
closer one where an employer announces that such a plan will only be implemented if 85 or 90 percent of the employees vote in favor of it. Courts' future
receptivity to arguments based on collective decision making may well depend heavily on the facts and circumstances of particularcases.
Id. (emphasis added).
188. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
189. Bauman v. Bish, 571 F. Supp. 1054, 1063 (N.D. W. Va. 1983).
190. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 556 n.8 (1979); see supra
note 63 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 29.
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vote.19 2 The collective decision to invest in the ESOP, however,
which the court characterized as involuntary, 193 is subsequent to
the employer's offer of the ESOP and is therefore irrelevant to application of the 1933 Act.'"
The courts also applied, with equal inconsistency, the expectation of profits prong of the test. Childers and Uselton came to opposite conclusions on virtually identical facts. 9 5 The court's analysis in Childers is also puzzling. The court held that because any
expectation of profits would derive not from the management of
the ESOP, but from appreciation of the stock, no expectation of
profits from the efforts of others resulted.9 6 Apparently, the court
believed that to satisfy the test, either the term "others" had to
mean only the ESOP's fund managers, or that stock appreciation
in and of itself is not sufficient profit.
The court in Uselton found that the ESOP in question satisfied
the expectation of profits prong of the test. 9 7 Nevertheless, the
court carefully confined its holding to the narrow facts of the case,
apparently implying that not all ESOPs will qualify as investment
contracts: "Depending on the specific terms of the plan, therefore,
some voluntary, contributory employee interests will not qualify as
investment contracts under the Howey test."'19 8 This ambiguity is
precisely why the Howey-Daniel test is inappropriate in this context. A case-specific approach means that "coverage by the Acts
would in most cases be unknown and unknowable to the parties at
the time the stock was sold."' 199 Application of the Howey test to
ESOPs results in the same uncertainty and unpredictability that
200
the Supreme Court in Landreth sought to avoid.
192. Bauman, 571 F. Supp. at 1063-64.
193. Id. at 1063.
194. See infra notes 292-319 and accompanying text (discussing a superior method of
analyzing the sale or offer issue).
195. Compare Childers v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1357, 1363 (D.Minn.
1988) (holding that the plan failed the expectations prong) with Uselton v. Commercial
Lovelace Motor Freight, 940 F.2d 564, 576-77 (10th Cir.) (holding that the plan passed the
expectations. prong), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 589 (1991).
196. Childers, 688 F. Supp. at 1363.
197. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 570.
198. Id. at 584 n.23.
199. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 696 (1984).
200. One federal court has gone so far as to reject the Howey test outright. See Securities
Adm'r v. College Assistance Plan, 533 F. Supp. 118, 121 (D. Guam App. Div. 1981) ("In
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Both Childers and Bauman characterized the particular ESOPs
at issue as a means of deferring income. 20 1 This view ignores the
nature, reality, and the primary purpose of ESOPs-employee capital ownership. The only asset in ESOPs, the employer's stock, is
an investment that is far too speculative and risky to be a viable
method of income deferral. 0 2
Finally, these cases fail to promote congressional intent and contradict Supreme Court precedent. 20 3 Landreth, and later Reves,
demonstrate that an instrument does not have to be an investment
contract to be a security;20 4 otherwise, Congress' extensive list of
instruments that should always be deemed securities is rendered
meaningless. "Stock" and "certificates of interest" in stock are
20 5
among those instruments listed in the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
ESOPs therefore fall within the purview of the Acts by default.
Cases Not Relying on Howey-Daniel to Conclude ESOPs Are
Securities
The court in Hood v. Smith's Transfer Corp.206 did not use the
Howey test to determine whether an ESOP is a security within the
meaning of the Acts. The facts of this case are familiar. The plaintiffs had agreed to a fifteen percent wage cut in exchange for interests in an ESOP. 207 Each employee individually elected to participate.2 08 In this case, however, the defendant-employer had

application the test has generated confusions and criticism for its failure to [examine substance rather than form].").
201. Childers v Northwest Airlines, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1357, 1363 (D. Minn. 1988);
Bauman v. Bish, 571 F. Supp. 1054, 1063 (N.D. W.Va. 1988).
202. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
203. Bauman, however, was decided before Landreth.
204. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 696 (1984); Reves v. Ernst & Young,
494 U.S. 56, 64 (1990).
205. See supra note 39.
206. 762 F. Supp. 1274 (W.D. Ky, 1991).
207. Id. at 1277.
208. Id. at 1279. Interestingly, the Teamsters Union had refused to recommend or approve the proposed ESOP to its members. Id. The Teamsters Union had been involved in
many cases concerning alleged securities fraud in connection with ESOPs and pensions. Id.
at 1281. Perhaps this refusal to approve the ESOP was a savvy realization that putting the
proposed ESOP to a vote might have rendered the plan involuntary and hence either not an
investment under Howey-Daniel or not a sale of a security as per Bauman. See supra notes
152-70, 173-83 and accompanying text.
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registered the ESOP with the SEC and issued a prospectus to employees. 0 9 After a merger, the company terminated the ESOP.210
Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit, alleging, inter alia, material mis2 11
statements in the prospectus regarding the valuation of shares.
The court refused to apply the Howey-Daniel test to resolve the
definitional status of the ESOP at issue.2 12 Citing Landreth, the
court emphasized that the Howey test applies only to determine
whether an instrument is an investment contract,213 and applies
only when the interest at issue does not fit within one of the instruments listed in the Acts.2 14 Otherwise, universal application of
the Howey test would render the specific enumeration of instruments in the Acts superfluous. 2 5 The court correctly characterized
the interests in the ESOP as simply interests in stock, and hence
literally subject to the Acts:
Participants in Smith's ESOP acquired shares of common stock.
Stock is one of the kinds of securities specifically enumerated in
the statutory definition. Unlike the Daniel plaintiffs, plaintiffs
here make no claim concerning any interest in an investment
contract, and the Howey test is simply inapplicable ....
The
Smith's ESOP was simply a device for distributing stock in accordance with plaintiffs' decisions to make those investments.216
The fact that the participants' interests possessed the "traditional characteristics of securities-e.g., an assigned par value, the
future possibility of dividend payments, the capacity to appreciate,
and voting rights" 2 7-also influenced the decision. The defendant's reliance on Daniel was misplaced, the court held, because
Daniel involved a pension plan; in contrast, an ESOP "does not

209. Hood, 762 F. Supp. at 1278.
210. Id. at 1280.
211. Id. at 1281.
212. Id. at 1291.
213. Id. (citing Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 691 (1984)).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1289. The court also "acknowledge[d] that the ESOP restricted plaintiffs' ability to negotiate and pledge the shares allocated to them under the ESOP, but conclude[d]
that those restrictions are not sufficient to negate the character of plaintiffs' interests as
securities." Id. at 1290 n.22.
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have the primary indicia of a pension plan-i.e., the payment of
benefits only upon retirement."2 1
The opinion also stressed that the parties reasonably expected
that the Securities Acts would apply, because the defendants had
registered the ESOP with the SEC. 219 Subsequently to deny the
ESOP's status as a security placed the defendants in an untenable
position: "The prospectus prominently and repeatedly refers to
ESOP participants' interests as shares of common stock and as

securities. "220
Although doing so was not necessary to the decision, the court
distinguished the ESOP from the pension plan in Daniel by char2 21
It
acterizing the ESOP interests as voluntary and contributory.
noted that employees had a choice whether to participate and the
court deemed payroll deductions direct payments for the purchase
of common stock.2 2 2 The court also stated that "[n]either plaintiffs
nor [defendant] intended those deductions to be a mere deferral of

income. "223
The court in Harris v. Republic Airlines, Inc.224 also used the
Landreth plain meaning approach with respect to an ESOP. The
plaintiffs had relinquished current pension rights and agreed to a
wage cut in exchange for participation in a partnership plan and
an ESOP. 2 5 The employer later reneged on certain promises it
made concerning eligibility requirements. 2 6
Quoting Judge Friendly's perceptively simple statement,
"[s]tock is indubitably a security within the definitions of the Securities Acts, ' 227 Harris' reliance on Landreth closely tracked the
reasoning used in Hood. For example, the court held that the characteristics of the ESOP interest mirrored those of traditional

218. Id. at 1290.
219. Id. at 1289.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1290.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1290-91.
224. [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,772 (D.D.C. May 18,
1988).
225. Id. at 98,621-22.
226. Id. at 98,622.
227. Id. at 98,623 (quoting Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutrition Inst., Inc., 751 F.2d 555,
558 (2d Cir. 1985)).
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stock;22 8 the context in which the transaction took place raised expectations that the Acts would apply; 29 and, the court was unable
to characterize the ESOP as an ordinary pension plan.2 30 The employees were not merely deferring income but "were being asked
by management to make a fairly speculative capital investment in
the Company. They were not simply being asked to accept the
same compensation package in a different-presumably deferred-form. 2 1 Finally, the court found Daniel to be inapposite:
"The ESOP does not convert this case into an analogue to [International Brotherhood of] Teamsters v. Daniel and it does not in'23 2
sulate the transaction from the reach of federal securities laws.
The approach of the courts in these cases best serves the values
of certainty and deference to congressional intent and more accurately reflects the true nature of ESOPs as securities. In addition,
these opinions correctly point out that the context in which these
transactions occur raises expectations on the part of employees
that they now or later will own stock and that the federal securities
laws will protect them. As the Court in Landreth explained: "Instruments that bear both the name and all of the usual characteristics of stock seem to us to be the clearest case for coverage ....
[T]raditional stock represents to many people, both trained and
untrained in business matters, the paradigm of a security.2133 Landreth explicitly recognized the necessity of protecting expectations
that arise when parties deal in stock. 4
In soliciting employee participation, companies frequently tout
the ownership and profit-sharing aspects of an ESOP. For example, in Harris,the employer offered an ESOP with the accompanying statements: "Each employee is entitled to any dividends on his
or her stock and directs how the stock held in his or her account

228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 98,625.
231. Id. at 98,624. The court additionally wrote, "[P]laintiffs therefore did not simply
substitute one form of compensation for a different sort of compensation ....Instead, these
plaintiffs traded compensation for what amounted to an equity interest in the Company.
They became investors." Id. at 98,626 (emphasis added).
232. Id.
233. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 693 (1984).
234. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
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shall be voted at stockholders' meetings,
and "[t]hose who
share in the risk also share in any profits. 2 3 6 In Hood, the employer's prospectus frequently referred to the ESOP interests as
stock.23 7 Courts should not frustrate workers' reasonable expectations that employers engender with these promotional
statements.2 38
THE NEED FOR INVESTOR PROTECTION

Another argument for extending the application of the Securities
Acts to ESOPs without resorting to the Howey-Daniel test is the
need for investor protection, which a literal approach best serves.
The Supreme Court in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth239 and
Gould v. Ruefenacht24 0 expressed sensitivity to this concern.24 1
The need for protecting employees' expectations is even stronger
in the ESOP context than in the case of the relatively more sophisticated purchaser of a business. More so than almost any other
class of investor, employees-particularly blue-collar union members-would benefit from the registration and antifraud provisions
of the Acts.
2 4 2 the Supreme Court expressly recIn SEC v. Ralston-Purina,
ognized the need for the Acts' protections in the context of employee stock ownership plans. The case dealt with the narrow issue
of whether a company's offer of its stock to employees was exempt
from registration under the 1933 Act as "not involving any public
offering."24 The Court upheld the SEC's injunction against Ralston-Purina's further sales of its common stock to 417 of its lower-

235. Harris, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,772, at 98,622.
236. Id. at 98,621.
237. Hood v. Smith's Transfer Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1274, 1289 (W.D. Ky. 1991).
238. See generally Robert N. Rapp, The Role of Promotional Characteristicsin Determining the Existence of A Security, 9 SEc. REG. L.J. 26 (1981) (arguing that the manner of
promotion should be a factor in the determination of whether a security exists).
239. 471 U.S. 681, 693 (1984).
240. 471 U.S. 701, 706 (1985).
241. "[Tjhe parties' inability to determine at the time of the transaction whether the Acts
apply neither serves the Acts' protective purpose nor permits the purchaser to compensate
for the added risk of no protection when negotiating the transaction." Gould, 471 U.S. at
706; see supra note 17.
242. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
243. Id. at 120 (construing § 4(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1988)).
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level workers. 244 The opinion emphasized that employees are not
less entitled to protections under the 1933 Act merely by virtue of
their employment relationship. 245 The Court stated:
The focus of the inquiry should be on the need of the offerees
for the protections afforded by registration. The employees here
were not shown to have access to the kind of information which
registration would disclose. The obvious opportunities for pressure and imposition make it advisable
that they be entitled to
24
compliance with [registration]. 1

The need for investor protection is especially strong in the context of employee stock ownership plans. Corporations do not always establish ESOPs with the best interests of employees in
mind. They often utilize ESOPs as a means of entrenching current
management in order to ward off potential takeovers.241 The potential for abusive and fraudulent behavior is clear.
ESOPs are most frequently formed in labor-intensive companies.24s Employees who participate in ESOPs are typically bluecollar union members who are relatively unsophisticated in the vagaries of securities and financial markets. 249 The information that

244. Id. at 121.
245. Id. at 126.
246. Id. at 127 (emphasis added). The Court cited a House Report explaining the reasons
for the rejection of a 1934 amendment that would have exempted employee stock offerings
from the Acts: "[P]articipants in employees' stock-investment plans may be in as great need
of the protection afforded by the availability of information concerning the issuer for which
they work as are most other members of the public." Id. at 126 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1838,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934)).
247. See McLean, supra note 107, at 766. Professor McLean writes:
An ESOP is a valuable corporate device which confers benefits upon the employees and the corporation.... However, the potential benefit to the corporation offered by the use of an ESOP as a corporate takeover defense tool should
be deterred. In light of ERISA and recent court decisions, the scope and establishment of an ESOP should be limited to its intended purpose-an employee
benefit plan-not a weapon in the high power arena of corporate takeovers.
Id.
248. Labor-intensive companies can utilize the tax deduction allowances for employer
contributions to a greater extent than capital-intensive companies, because deductible contributions are limited to a percentage of the total compensation paid to all employees. See
Blackiston, supra note 105, at 86.
249. See Joseph J. Ziino, Registrationof Stock Option Plans Under the Securities Act of
1933, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 27, 29-30 (1975) (asserting that nonexecutive employees "are less
likely to have access to the information about the issuer or familiarity with the workings of
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would be available to employees or their union representatives
would better enable them to make intelligent investment decisions
when the time comes for a collective vote.
Use of the Howey-Daniel test subverts the broad remedial purpose of the Acts. To avoid subjection to the Acts' registration and
antifraud provisions, an employer need only structure the ESOP's
enactment in such a way as to render it involuntary.2 50 When a
company proposes an ESOP to its employees, it simply can condition the ESOP's formation on the outcome of a collective union
voteye 1 Those employees in the majority who voted in favor of the
plan are under the impression that the Securities Acts will apply. 252 A less-than-unanimous vote, however, might render the interest involuntary, and hence not an investment under the HoweyDaniel test.2 53 Current law encourages management to structure
the ESOP's formation in as involuntary a manner as possible in
order to preclude application of the Acts.2 54 These plans are exactly the type that require special solicitude for employees.
One may question the efficacy of providing prospectuses to relatively unsophisticated employees who probably will not even read

the option plan. The broader the employee group included under the plan, the greater is the
need for assuring disclosure of material information .. .

250. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
251. See, e.g., Childers v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1357 (D. Minn. 1988).
252. See supra notes 235-38 and accompanying text.
253. In addition, under the rule of Bauman, a court may find that no sale has taken place
in such a case. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
254. See Baeza & Taylor, supra note 127, at 706-08.
If plan participation is ...rendered voluntary and contributory, the company
may be forced to undergo the expense and delay of registration and could be
placed in the awkward position of having to disclose sensitive financial information such as projections.
...[W]hen a plan is implemented for a large group of employees on the basis
of less-than-unanimous votes, the plan will be considered involuntary and noncontributory for purposes of the Securities Acts.
...[A]ny employer considering the solicitation of employee consent in connection with the implementation of an ESOP funded in whole or in part by
wage concessions should at the very least be careful to structure the solicitation so that both cutbacks and plan participationare imposed on a groupwide basis and, if employee approval is necessary or desirable,in conjunction
with a collective vote.
Id. (emphasis added).
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them. Indeed, commentators have questioned whether the entire
concept of registration in general actually leads to more intelligent
and informed investing. 55 Whatever the merit of these criticisms,
registration of ESOPs would undoubtedly facilitate informed decisionmaking, particularly in the context of collectively bargainedfor ESOPs. Unions often retain experienced legal counsel and
other experts who can assist the union membership in evaluating
the securities that an employer offers. Moreover, mandatory disclosure of sensitive information and the threat of antifraud claims
may cause an employing company to think twice before attempting
to offer an ESOP that is not in the best interests of employees.
POTENTIAL

ERISA

PREEMPTION

Opponents of applying Securities Act coverage to ESOPs, and to
employee benefit plans in general, argue that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 256 regulates ESOPs as
employee benefit plans and thus courts need not be concerned with
the additional protections afforded by the Securities Acts.' 57 The
Supreme Court in Daniel held that the existence of ERISA undercuts arguments for applying the Acts to pension plans. 2 58 Never-

theless, ERISA should present no bar to application of the Acts to
ESOPs.
One major criticism of overlapping regulation is a perceived
doubling of compliance costs. 2 59 The SEC, however, recently has

promulgated rules that allow employers to file ERISA-mandated
summary plan descriptions (SPDs) in lieu of standard 1933 Act delivery requirements.260 Registration costs under current require255. See, e.g., HAZEN, supra note 12, at 60.
256. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
257. See, e.g., John K. Drisdale, Jr., Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Securities
Laws, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 19, 27 (1980).
258. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 569 (1979); see supra note
61 and accompanying text.
259. See, e.g., Timothy Tomlinson, Securities Regulation of Employee Stock Ownership
Plans: A Comparison of SEC Policy and Congressional Intent, 31 STAN. L. REv. 121, 122
(1978).
260. Securities Act Release No. 6867, supra note 33. The employer must supplemient the
SPD with information required to be disclosed in form S-8 and must distribute the SPD
prior to employee participation. Id. In addition, the new rules considerably relax S-8 reporting requirements and render compliance less expensive overall. Id.; see supra note 33.
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ments therefore should correspond roughly to costs already imposed .by ERISA.
If interests in ESOPs are securities, then the fact that ERISA
also regulates ESOPs should not preclude application of the Acts.
Congress did not condition applicability of the Securities Acts on
the nonexistence of alternative regulation, particularly when the
instrument at issue has attributes of stock, the paradigm instrument of securities regulation.2 6 ' Indeed, when Congress enacted the
1933 and 1934 Acts, it envisioned the concurrent regulation of
state blue sky laws.26 2
When courts ruled that a particular instrument was not a security, they often relied on the "context" clause of the Acts. Congress
prefaced the definitional provisions of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts
with the statement beginning "[w]hen used in this chapter, unless
' '2 3
the context otherwise requires ... [t]he term 'security' means.
Some courts interpreting these phrases have construed the term
"context" to mean the factual context of the transaction involving
the sale of a security, as opposed to the textual context of a particular term within the Acts.264 Under this interpretation, an instrument that the Acts would otherwise classify as a security nevertheless may not be a security if the existence of other factors, such as
alternative regulatory schemes, leads a court to conclude that applicability of the Acts is unwarranted. 6 5
The Supreme Court in Landreth most likely rejected this interpretation of the context clause. 26 6 First, the decision reached in

261. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
262. See SEC v. Variable Annuity Co., 359 U.S. 65, 75 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring).
263. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(l), 78c(a)(10); see supra note 39.
264. See, e.g., Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 557-59 (1981) (holding that the existence of extensive banking regulation precluded a finding that a certificate of deposit is a
security). Marine Bank and its interpretation of the context clause has been the subject of
strident criticism. See, e.g., Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 41. Some courts have refused
to construe the prefatory language as referring to the factual context. See American Bankers
Ass'n v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739, 753-54 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320,
330-32 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds sub. nom. Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701
(1985).
265. See, e.g., Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 557-59 (exempting certificates of deposit); Wolf
v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, 739 F.2d 1458, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1984) (same), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1108 (1985).
266. See M. Thomas Arnold, The Definition of A Security Under the Federal Securities
Law Revisited, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 249, 258 (1986) ("The effect of the decisions in Landreth

1992]

APPLICATION OF SECURITIES LAWS TO ESOPS

Landreth, based on its facts, is itself an implicit rejection of such
an interpretation of the context clause. The purchaser of a business is probably least likely to need coverage under the Acts, yet
the Court held such a purchaser to be entitled to the Acts' protections.2 67 Second, an expansive interpretation of the context clause
would undercut the Supreme Court's recently expressed desire for
certainty and consistency in securities regulation because the definition of a security conceivably could vary depending on the existence and adequacy of alternative regulatory schemes of both state
and federal legislation and the common law of contracts. 2 8 Third,
a factual interpretation of "context" has the effect of rendering the
specific enumeration of instruments in the definitional provisions
of the Acts just as meaningless as does universal application of the
Howey test.2 69 Congress could not have intended the context clause
to vitiate other express provisions in the Acts.2170 Strong evidence
of legislative intent reveals that the context clause originally was

and [Gould] is to preclude the examination of factual context when traditional stock is
involved.").
267. The Court in Landreth held that the purchaser of 100% of the controlling stock of a
corporation is entitled to the Acts' protections. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S.
681, 694 (1984). The purchaser of a business, however, probably needs least the types of
protection afforded by the Securities Acts. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissenting
opinion, the buyers in Landreth had entered into an extensive stock purchase agreement
containing "appropriate [contractual] warranties" and had the ability "to insist on the exchange and independent evaluation of relevant financial information before entering into
the transactions." Id. at 700 (footnote omitted) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Rosin,
supra note 41, at 336 (discussing these protections).
268. See Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 41, at 510 (arguing that the existence of state
and foreign regulation would lead to inconsistency under the context clause). "The Weaver
[context] analysis ... suggests that in the absence of clear legislative intent, the definition of
'security' could expand and contract with the ebb and flow of future legislation ......
Id. at
511.
269. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. If the context clause factually modifies the provision defining a security, it must also factually modify the entire list of general
definitions in the Acts. Under a factual interpretation of the context clause, therefore, the
term "Commission" does not mean the Securities and Exchange Commission, despite Section 2(5) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(5) (1988), if the factual context dictates otherwise.
270. See Rosin, supra note 41, at 363 ("the introductory phrase is a slender thread from
which to hang judicial nullification of the statute's express declaration of the scope of the
term security"); Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 41, at 509 ("the indefinite language of
the prefatory clause [should not] govern the express terms of the statutory definition").
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intended to refer only to the textual, not factual, context in which
27 1
the Acts use the terms.
A factual interpretation of the context clause also contradicts
congressional intent expressed in provisions of both ERISA and
the Securities Acts, providing that neither is intended to displace
already existing rights and remedies. For example, the 1934 Act
expressly provides that "[t]he rights and remedies provided by this
chapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity. ' 2 72 Similarly, Congress did
not intend ERISA to supersede any existing federal law.27 3 Under
the Supreme Court's current approach to statutory interpretation,
congressional intent is equated with the statutory text.27 4 Both of
these express provisions therefore compel a finding that ESOPs are
subject to the Acts if they are deemed securities.
In addition, ERISA's regulatory scheme presents an inadequate
substitute for the protections afforded by the Securities Acts. The
Tenth Circuit in Uselton devoted a substantial portion of its opinion to rebutting the assertion that ERISA precludes the Acts' ap27
plicability to ESOPs.

271. See Rosin, supra note 41, at 363-64; Steinberg, supra note 41, at 504 n.91. But see

Louis Loss,

FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION

246 (2d ed. 1988) (concluding from

the same evidence of legislative intent that Congress did intend the factual context to be
taken into account).
272. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a).
273. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1988) ("Nothing in [ERISA] shall be construed to alter,
amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States... or any rule
or regulation issued under any such law.").
274. See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 694 n.7 (1984) (literally
applying the Acts to stock sold as a sale of a business despite conceding that Congress'
primary concern in enacting the securities laws was regulating publicly traded securities);
see also Rosin, supra note 41, at 336 ("The Supreme Court's current view [is] that statutory
structure and the common understanding of statutory language are the best evidence of
legislative intent .... ). See generally id. at 341-51 (reviewing recent cases in which the
Supreme Court rejected recourse to a statute's legislative history in order to limit its
language).
275. Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, 940 F.2d 564, 581-86 (10th. Cir.),
cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 589 (1991). The Tenth Circuit held that ERISA should only preempt
securities regulation if it serves the dual purposes underlying the Acts: one, to compel the
disclosure of "relevant, accurate information upon which to base an investment decision,"
id. at 581 (quoting Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 879 F.2d 772, 786 (10th Cir.
1989)), and two, to provide adequate remedies for fraud and misrepresentation. Id. at 582.
The CQurt found that ERISA fails to serve those values effectively. Id.
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First, ERISA's disclosure requirements address only employees
who are already participants or beneficiaries. 7 6 Unlike the 1933
Act,277 ERISA does nothing to assist those considering whether to
invest.27 8 Moreover, even ERISA-mandated disclosure does not reveal facts regarding the plan's financing or the issuer's financial
soundness unless the participant specifically requests such information.2 7 9 This information is therefore not automatically disclosed to present participants280and is not required to be disclosed at
all to potential participants.
Second, although the Secretary of Labor has authority to monitor ERISA plans and to take corrective action on participants' behalf,28s the Secretary has only the potential ability to insure that
ERISA's fiduciary and funding obligations are met.28 2 With a conventional pension plan, such regulation might be sufficient. The
value of an ESOP to employees, however, is not significantly dependent on the employer's funding and proper management of
plan assets.28 3 Rather, the ESOP's value is totally dependent on
the value of the employer's stock and, therefore, on the financial
soundness of the employer itself. 28 4 The 1933 Act, unlike ERISA,
allows potential investors access to information that would allow
for such a financial assessment.
Third, ERISA provides no remedies to participants whom the
employer induces to participate in the ESOP through the use of
fraudulent statements or omissions.28 5 No ERISA remedies redress
276. Id. at 581 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021(a), 1024(b)).
277. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (1988) (requiring prospectus for potential investors).
278. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 581; see also Ford, supra note 96, at 59-60 ("ERISA requires an
employee to make an investment, which significantly affects his future financial security,
without the opportunity to obtain sufficient information necessary to make a knowing investment decision or to evaluate the risks involved in the investment.").
279. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 581. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) (requiring disclosure of the
source of financing and the identity of organization) with 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77g, 77aa (Schedule A) (enumerating strict registration requirements to be satisfied by the issuer of a security) and Ford, supra note 96, at 60 ("the federal securities laws provide greater protection
for investors by providing them with sufficient information about the quality and integrity
of a company's management, its financial condition, and its securities").
280. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 581-82 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1023, 1024(b)(2), (4)).
281. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).
282. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 582 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1023, 1081-1086, 1101-1114, 1132(a)(2)).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
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preparticipation fraud.2 86 ERISA's remedies are limited to an
award of benefits due under the plan, enforcement of the plan's
disclosure, funding and administrative requirements, and appropriate relief for breach of a fiduciary duty by a plan administrator.28 7 In contrast, the Securities Acts authorize private actions in
order to rescind fraudulent transactions and to recover amounts
invested.2 8 8
Although ERISA complements the Securities Acts, it is far from
a duplicative or even adequate protective regulatory scheme from
the perspective of the employee-investor, Daniel notwithstanding. 28 9 One should not read the Supreme Court's dicta in Daniel2 0
as holding that ERISA preempts SEC regulation over all employee
benefit plans, even those that bear the usual attributes and risks
associated with common stock.29 '
OFFER OR SALE FOR VALUE

Once a court has determined the existence of a security, it must
still determine whether a sale of a security for value has taken
place in order for the 1934 Act's antifraud provisions to apply and
whether a sale or an offer to sell for value has occurred in order for
292
the 1933 Act's registration and antifraud provisions to apply.
286. Id. at 583. Unlike the provisions of the 1933 Act, ERISA's limited antifraud provisions do not even apply to fraudulent statements or omissions when made either orally or in
written material not required by ERISA. See Ford, supra note 96, at 60-61; supra note 37
and accompanying text.
287. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 582-83 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109, 1132(a)(1)-(4)).
288. Id. at 582 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988) and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1990)).
289. Cf. Levin, supra note 4, at 154 n.24.
As a practical matter, this Note questions the ability of the designated ESOP
regulators, the Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service, to void
abusive ESOP transactions .... Limited staffing at the Department of Labor
strongly suggests that these transactions will overwhelm government oversight
capabilities ....
Id.
290. See Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 41, at 506 ("Justice Powell's dicta in Daniel
appears to have been little more than an afterthought .... ).
291. Despite Daniel, the SEC has maintained persistently that the registration and antifraud requirements of the Securities Acts apply to voluntary and contributory pension
plans. See Securities Act Release No. 6188, supra note 33.
292. Whereas the 1933 Act provides that "[t]he term 'sale' or 'sell' shall include every
contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for value," and "[t]he
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The Daniel decision never reached this issue with respect to interests in employee benefit plans. 9
In response to the Daniel decision, the SEC took the position
that the sale of interests in an employee benefit plan occurs when
an employee makes an "investment decision" and "furnish[es]
value"; 294 that is, when the plan is voluntary and contributory.
With respect to employee benefit plans, therefore, the test that the
SEC uses to determine whether a sale has taken place is essentially
the same test courts following Daniel have used in determining
whether a security-an investment contract-exists.2 9 5
The Howey test should not be used to collapse these two analyses into one. Landreth made clear that the Howey formulation
should apply only to give meaning to the term "investment contract."2'96 The same problems of inconsistency and unpredictability
result in making distinctions based on the voluntariness of a plan
in the context of an ESOP that was the result of collective bargaining.2 97 Moreover, this approach ignores the 1933 Act's "offer" requirement2 9 s and fails to recognize and protect the expectations of
those employees who vote affirmatively to participate in the
29 9

ESOP.

term 'offer to sell'
shall include every attempt or offer to dispose of... a security.., for
value," 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3), the 1934 Act omits reference to the "for value" requirement. 15
U.S.C. § 78c(14). The absence of this provision might signify that the antifraud provisions of
the 1934 Act apply to a disposition of a security without value. The Supreme Court in
Daniel noted the difference but refused to discuss the issue in light of its resolution of the
definitional question. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 556 n.8
(1979). However, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-33 (1975),
the Court possibly made an implicit "for value" requirement when it ruled that a § 10(b)
private cause of action under the 1934 Act is limited to actual purchasers or sellers of securities, as opposed to those who would have bought or sold but for fraudulent statements or
omissions.
293. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
294. See Securities Act Release No. 6188, supra note 33, at 2073-3.
295. The court in Bauman v. Bish, 571 F. Supp. 1054, 1063-64 (N.D. W. Va. 1983), fell
prey to this same flawed approach. See supra notes 189-94 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text. "Such distinctions make little sense
in view of the Acts' purpose to protect investors." Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701, 706
(1985).
298. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 235-38, 250-54 and accompanying text.
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Once an ESOP interest is found to be a security, the question
with respect to applicability of the Acts in the context of collectively bargained-for ESOPs then becomes whether the employees
have been offered or have purchased a security for value when:
they will accept or have accepted wage reductions in exchange for
participation in an ESOP, as is often the case; they have voted or
will vote collectively, not individually, to accept wage reductions in
exchange for ESOP participation; and when an employee's acquisition of stock is contingent on meeting the vesting requirements of
the plan.
The latter two issues arise only with respect to the 1934 Act's
antifraud provisions. Registration requirements and antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act require only an offer to sell a security for
value. 0 0 Wage reductions implicate the "for value" concerns of
both the 1933 and 1934 Acts,30 ' but the issues of collective participation, dealing with acceptance of the employer's offer, and contingent ownership, dealing with when the transfer of stock ownership
is complete, are subsequent to the offer and irrelevant to 1933 Act
application. Those issues do relate, however, to the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act, which requires a complete sale, rather than
a mere offer, of a security in order to trigger its protections.302
With respect to the first issue, wage reductions constitute a relinquishment of existing contract rights and should always suffice
as an exchange for value within the meaning of the Acts.303 Indeed,
in cases where courts assumed the existence of a security and the
Howey test did not cloud the issue, courts have held that a mere
exchange of labor is sufficient to bring an offering and sale of stock
to employees within the 1933 and 1934 Acts.30 4 Regardless of the

300. See supra note 29.
301. This statement assumes an implicit "for value" requirement in the 1934 Act's antifraud provisions. See supra note 292.
302. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
303. See, e.g., Hood v. Smith's Transfer Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1274, 1290 (W.D. Ky. 1991);
Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 761 F. Supp. 1080, 1088 (D. Del. 1991) (payroll deductions
given in return for securities is an exchange for value for purposes of the 1934 Act); see also
Ziino, supra note 249, at 36 ("The Act is designed to protect persons who part with something of tangible or intangible value in exchange for securities.").
304. See, e.g., Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutrition Inst., Inc., 751 F.2d 555, 559-61 (2d Cir.
1985); Dubin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 138, 144-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Collins
v. Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282, 1287-89 (D. Mass. 1972). In Yoder, an employee provided both
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validity of those cases, however, many companies form ESOPs in
order to exact wage concessions from labor unions.30 5 Accepting a
wage reduction constitutes adequate value and is a sufficient investment decision to bring the transaction within the ambit of the
1933 and 1934 Acts. 0 6
The collective nature of ESOP employee participation poses a
dilemma to application of the 1934 Act, although not an intractable one. Not all ESOPs call for collective approval. For instance,
sometimes employers allow employees to decide on an individual
basis whether to participate in the plan. 0 7 Under the current
Howey-Daniel regime, however, employers are dissuaded from permitting individual election because this choice renders the plan
more voluntary under the first prong of the investment contract
test." 8
When a majority of union members agrees to accept wage reductions, those who vote with the majority make the requisite investment decision, and for them a sale of a security occurs.30 9 Those
union members in the minority, however, are forced to accept wage
reductions in exchange for ESOP participation. To deny completely application of the 1934 Act because some employees vote

assets and her services to her employer in exchange for stock, and so the court was not
required to decide whether:
sufficient allegations of fraudulent misrepresentations are made relating to
stock where the plaintiff merely promises to work for a defendant in return for
the latter's promise to deliver stock, . . . with or without the payment of a
salary-although... we see little reason for not holding to that effect.
Yoder, 751 F.2d at 561 (emphasis added); see also Claudia Silbert, Comment, Job Securities: When an Employment Agreement is a Sale of Stock Under Federal Securities Law, 52
BRo. L. REV. 975 (1986) (discussing Yoder).
305. See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 128, at 1804-05.
306. If the employer does not demand wage concessions, services, or any other consideration in return-a possibility, given an ESOP's tax advantages-then ESOP participation is
a true gift and hence no sale or offer for value occurs. If employees have nothing to lose,
then registration and antifraud remedies are unnecessary.
307. See, e.g., Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, 940 F.2d 564, 570, 575
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 589 (1991).
308. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
309. See Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1243 (1977) (concluding that a sufficient sale took place when employees ratified a collective bargaining agreement calling for adoption of a pension plan), rev'd on other grounds, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
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against participation is harsh, particularly for those in the majority
310
who reasonably expect the Securities Acts to apply.
Two tentative responses to this obstacle of finding a sale are possible. First, by accepting union representation and by participating
in the referendum, employees tacitly consent to the outcome of the
vote. The employees collectively have made an investment decision
and therefore the employees, taken as a whole, should be entitled
to the protections of the 1934 Act. Alternatively, the 1934 Act covers dissenting employees under a twist of the judicially crafted
forced seller doctrine. Under the forced seller theory, a shareholder
forced to sell his shares is still considered a seller of securities for
purposes of the Acts. 311 In the context of collectively bargained-for
ESOPs, dissenting employees are "forced buyers." Although no
cases have considered the possibility of a "forced buyer" doctrine,
no principled reason exists for not applying the same rationale to
protect those forced to purchase securities.3 12
The final issue under the sale rubric of the 1934 Act is that of
vesting requirements. in a tangentially related case, the Second
Circuit shed some light on the effect of vesting preconditions on
the sale requirement. In Yoder v. OrthomolecularNutrition Institute, Inc., 3 the plaintiff had exchanged her services and certain
assets in return for shares of her employer's stock.31 4 Delivery was

310. See supra notes 235-38 and accompanying text.
311. The Second Circuit first enunciated the forced seller doctrine in Vine v. Beneficial
Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967), in order to extend the 1934 Act's antifraud protections to a shareholder forced to sell his shares as the
result of a short-form merger. Courts have applied the forced seller doctrine in contexts
other than the short-form merger. See, e.g., Alley v. Miramon, 614 F.2d 1372, 1380-81 (5th
Cir. 1980) (applying the doctrine to liquidation); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.,
419 F.2d 787, 798 (2d Cir.) (discussing disappointed tender offeror "forced" to sell its shares
back to target corporation), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1969).
312. A prerequisite to application of the forced seller doctrine is proof of a fundamental
change of investment, from an interest in a going enterprise to a right solely to a payment of
money. Mosher v. Kane, 784 F.2d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir. 1986); Jeanes v. Henderson, 703 F.2d
855, 859-60 (5th Cir. 1983). In the ESOP context, the exact opposite occurs: employees relinquish a right to higher wage payments in return for an interest in a going enterprise. An
involuntary conversion exists in either case.
This approach could also be applicable when the employer imposes ESOP participation
on all employees as a condition of employment; in this situation, all employees would be
"forced buyers."
313. 751 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1985).
314. Id. at 558.
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conditioned on the plaintiff's attaining a certain level of sales, 315
similar to an employee's acquisition of stock in an ESOP being
conditioned on meeting vesting requirements. The court stated:
"We perceive no reason why a contingency attached to a contractual right to acquire stock should remove that right from securities
law coverage simply because it increases the risk that plaintiff will
not obtain the shares."31 6 In support of this contention, the court
cited Marine Bank v. Weaver,3 in which the Supreme Court held
that "a pledge of stock is equivalent to a sale for purposes of the
antifraud provisions 3 18 of the 1934 Act, despite the fact that complete transfer of ownership would occur only in the result of default by the borrower." 9
Application of these established principles yields the conclusion
that preconditions to vesting are immaterial to the sale requirement for purposes of the 1934 Act's antifraud provisions. Nor
should the collective nature of ESOP formation preclude application of the 1934 Act. The 1933 Act's registration and antifraud requirements of an offer to sell for value and the 1934 Act's "for
value" requirement are met because wage reductions constitute
sufficient value.
CONCLUSION

Once the true nature and purpose of employee stock ownership
plans are understood, the fact that ESOPs are not the functional
equivalent of conventional pension plans becomes clear. ESOPs are
grossly inadequate as income deferral devices, and Congress did
not intend ESOPs to serve such a function. An employee who participates in an ESOP becomes an investor, acquiring an interest
that bears the risks and possesses all the attributes of traditional
common stock. Courts should not succumb to the deceptive "employee benefit plan" label and erroneously assume that Daniel controls the definitional issue.
315. Id. at 559.
316. Id. at 559 n.4.
317. 455 U.S. 551 (1981).
318. Id. at 554 n.2.
319. Id.; see also Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) ("It is not essential
under the terms of the Act that full title pass to a transferee for the transaction to be an
'offer' or a 'sale.' ").
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Landreth is decisive authority for applying the Securities Acts'
definitional provisions literally when possible. ESOPs constitute
certificates of interest or participation in stock and therefore fall
within the purview of the Acts by default. Such an approach is far
superior to the inconsistent and unpredictable Howey-Daniel formulation; it comports with congressional intent and best protects
investing employees.
As companies continue to form ESOPs with increasing frequency, employees particularly need the Acts' protections because
ESOP formation carries the potential for abusive and fraudulent
tactics and workers are relatively lacking in financial sophistication. Employees justifiably expect that the Securities Acts will apply to the sale of instruments that possess all the common attributes of stock and which the employer promotes as stock.
Sean S. Hogle

